Case Background
The dispute arose from agricultural land in Siwan district. Both sides agreed that the recorded tenant (khatiyani raiyat) of the land was one Jita Chamar.
The first party, represented originally by Suba Ram, claimed to be the legal heir and successor of Jita Chamar. He said he was in possession of the land and that some houses had been constructed on a part of it.
The second party, who later became the petitioners before the Patna High Court, claimed that they had obtained the land through execution of a mortgage decree. They said they were in possession and were paying land revenue to the Government.
On 15.10.1988, the Officer-in-charge of the local police station reported that there was tension between the two sides because of the land dispute. On this basis, a proceeding under Section 144 CrPC was initiated to prevent immediate breach of peace.
Later, by order dated 31.12.1988, the Section 144 CrPC proceeding was closed. On the same date, the Executive Magistrate started a proceeding under Section 145 CrPC, after hearing both parties. In the preliminary order, the Magistrate recorded the rival claims but did not mention any clear satisfaction about likelihood of breach of public peace.
In the Section 145 CrPC proceeding (Trial No. 22 of 2000), both sides filed written statements and examined their witnesses. After inquiry, on 16.11.2000, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (S.D.M.), Maharajganj, held that the second party (present petitioners) were in possession. He restrained the first party (legal heirs of Suba Ram, now O.P. Nos. 2 to 5) from disturbing their peaceful possession until orders of a competent civil court.
The first party then filed Criminal Revision No. 44 of 2001 before the Sessions Court, Siwan. By order dated 26.08.2011, the Sessions Court set aside the S.D.M.’s order dated 16.11.2000. Against this, the present petitioners approached the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1121 of 2012.
In that earlier revision, the Patna High Court set aside the Sessions Court’s 26.08.2011 order and sent the matter back to the Sessions Court to decide afresh according to law. On remand, the Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI, Siwan, again allowed the revision on 30.11.2018, set aside the 16.11.2000 order of the Executive Magistrate, and held that the first party (Suba Ram) was in possession of the land.
Aggrieved by this 30.11.2018 order, the second party approached the Patna High Court once again by filing the present Criminal Revision No. 391 of 2019.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Patna High Court, through Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jitendra Kumar, heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned APP for the State, and the learned counsel for opposite party nos. 2 to 5.
The petitioners’ counsel attacked the Sessions Court order on two main grounds. First, he argued that the Sessions Court was wrong in holding that O.P. Nos. 2 to 5, as legal heirs of the first party, were in possession. According to him, the petitioners had better claim, as they had obtained the land in execution of a decree and were paying land revenue, and the S.D.M. had already found them to be in possession.
Second, and more fundamentally, he submitted that the entire proceeding under Section 145 CrPC was not maintainable from the very beginning. He argued that the basic requirement for invoking Section 145 CrPC is apprehension of breach of public peace, and in this case, the facts only showed a private dispute about title and possession. Therefore, there was no occasion for the Executive Magistrate to start a proceeding under Section 145 CrPC.
On the other hand, the learned APP for the State and the counsel for opposite parties 2 to 5 supported the Sessions Court order. They contended that there was no illegality or infirmity. They reiterated that O.P. Nos. 2 to 5 are legal heirs of first party Suba Ram, who himself was heir of the khatiyani raiyat, and they were in possession with houses built on part of the land.
The High Court first set out the legal framework. It reproduced Section 145 CrPC in detail and underscored its position within Chapter X of the Code, which deals with maintenance of public order and tranquility. The Court highlighted that Sections 145 to 148 CrPC specifically address disputes over immovable property, but always from the standpoint of preventing breaches of peace.
The Court explained that Section 145 CrPC allows an Executive Magistrate to act when he is satisfied, based on a police report or other information, that a dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause a breach of peace. He must then make a written order, stating the grounds of his satisfaction, and call the parties to submit their claims about actual possession.
Crucially, during such proceedings the Magistrate is not supposed to decide title or ownership. His role is limited to finding which side was in actual possession at the relevant time, or whether someone was recently and wrongfully dispossessed, and to pass a temporary order to maintain peace until a competent court decides rights finally.
The Court noted that the inquiry under Section 145 CrPC is intended as a speedy and summary remedy to prevent breach of peace, not as a substitute for civil litigation over ownership or long-term rights. For this, the Court referred to several Supreme Court and High Court decisions, such as:
- Ashok Kumar v. State of Uttrakhand, (2013) 3 SCC 366
- Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi, (2004) 1 SCC 438
- Ranbir Singh v. Dalbir Singh & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 700
- Prakash Chand Sachdeva v. P.R. & Anr., (1994) 1 SCC 471
- Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik, (1978) 1 SCC 210
- R.H. Bhutani v. Mani J. Desai, 1968 SCC Online SC 5
- Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960
- and several other High Court judgments.
From these authorities and from the statute, the Court drew two key principles. First, the condition precedent to starting a Section 145 CrPC proceeding is the Magistrate’s satisfaction that there is a dispute likely to cause breach of public peace, and this satisfaction must be recorded with reasons in the preliminary order. Second, the concept of public peace and tranquility is much wider than a simple quarrel between a few individuals over private property. If the effect of the dispute is restricted to the parties alone, it does not amount to a threat to public order or peace.
The Court stressed that private disputes about title and possession are meant to be decided by civil courts. Chapter X CrPC gives “extraordinary” preventive powers to Executive Magistrates only to prevent breaches of public peace, not to resolve ordinary civil disputes.
The Court further warned that if Executive Magistrates use Section 145 CrPC to interfere in private civil disputes without real apprehension of public disorder, it becomes a colourable exercise of power. Such misuse would encroach upon the jurisdiction of civil courts, harass citizens through unnecessary criminal-type proceedings, and disturb the balance of powers in the legal system.
To support this view, the Court also referred to other precedents including Md. Ansaruddin v. State of Assam, (2008) Cri.L.J. (NOC) 479 (Gau), Chirstalin Costa v. State of Goa, 1993 MHLJ 1409, and Tarulata Devi v. Nikhil Bandhu Mishra, 1982 SCC Online Gau 35.
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court carefully examined the preliminary order dated 31.12.1988 by which the Executive Magistrate converted the earlier Section 144 CrPC proceeding into a Section 145 CrPC proceeding.
The Court found that the preliminary order only recorded rival claims of title and possession: the first party as legal heir of khatiyani raiyat and the second party claiming under an execution of mortgage decree and payment of land revenue. The Magistrate merely said he could not decide possession without an inquiry, and therefore initiated Section 145 CrPC proceedings.
However, the Magistrate did not say anywhere in that preliminary order that there was apprehension of breach of public peace on account of the dispute over possession. Nor did he state any grounds for such apprehension.
The High Court compared this with the legal requirement that the preliminary order must explicitly reflect the Magistrate’s satisfaction about a likely breach of peace, based on the police report or other information. As this satisfaction was missing and no ground for public peace disturbance was mentioned, the very foundation of the Section 145 CrPC proceeding was absent.
The Court concluded that the alleged facts and circumstances constituted a private civil dispute over title and possession, which could only be properly adjudicated by a civil court. The Executive Magistrate, instead of invoking Section 145 CrPC, should have directed the parties to take their claims to the civil court.
On this basis, the Court held that there was no occasion for the Executive Magistrate to initiate a proceeding under Section 145 CrPC. It described the proceeding as a colourable exercise of power which encroached on the jurisdiction of the civil court, amounting to abuse of the process of the court.
Having reached this conclusion, the High Court did not need to go deeper into which side was actually in possession. It quashed the entire Section 145 CrPC proceeding itself, as well as the subsequent order dated 30.11.2018 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge-VI, Siwan, in Criminal Revision No. 44 of 2001.
The Court clarified that the parties are at liberty to move the civil court for adjudication of their rights, including questions of title and possession, and to seek appropriate interim relief such as injunction or appointment of a receiver, as per civil law.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for people involved in land disputes in Bihar and elsewhere. It clearly says that Section 145 CrPC is not a shortcut to settle ownership or family land quarrels.
If there is no real danger of public peace being disturbed, the Executive Magistrate should not drag people into Section 145 CrPC proceedings. Instead, parties must file a civil suit and get their rights decided there.
The judgment protects ordinary citizens from being forced into criminal-style preventive proceedings when their dispute is essentially civil. It also reminds Magistrates to record, in writing, why they think there is a likely breach of public peace before starting such a case.
For lawyers and litigants, this Patna High Court decision reinforces that questions of title and possession belong to civil courts, and misuse of Section 145 CrPC can be challenged and quashed.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Can an Executive Magistrate initiate a proceeding under Section 145 CrPC in a purely private land dispute without recording satisfaction about likely breach of public peace?
Answer: No. The Patna High Court held that apprehension of breach of public peace is a condition precedent. In this case, as the preliminary order did not record such satisfaction or grounds, the Section 145 CrPC proceeding itself was without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. - Issue: Should disputes about title and long-term right to possess land be decided under Section 145 CrPC?
Answer: No. The Court held that Section 145 CrPC is only for deciding who was in actual possession to prevent breach of peace, not for adjudicating title or civil rights. Such disputes must go to the civil court. - Issue: What is the effect of finding that a Section 145 CrPC proceeding was a colourable exercise of power?
Answer: The Court quashed both the impugned Sessions Court order dated 30.11.2018 and the very criminal proceeding under Section 145 CrPC, and left the parties free to approach the civil court.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Ashok Kumar v. State of Uttrakand, (2013) 3 SCC 366
- Sharad Yadav @ Gappu v. State of U.P., 2013 SCC Online All 4840
- Madhu Sharma v. Ajit Sharma, (2013) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 837
- Brahmputra Iron & Steel Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Premchand Tolaram Babna Charitable Trust, Assam, 2012 Cri.L.J. (NOC) 375 (Gau)
- Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi, (2004) 1 SCC 438
- Ranbir Singh v. Dalbir Singh & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 700
- Prakash Chand Sachdeva v. P.R. & Anr., (1994) 1 SCC 471
- Chandu Naik v. Sitaram B. Naik, (1978) 1 SCC 210
- R.H. Bhutani v. Mani J. Desai, 1968 SCC Online SC 5
- Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960
- Md. Ansaruddin v. State of Assam, (2008) Cri.L.J. (NOC) 479 (Gau)
- Chirstalin Costa v. State of Goa, 1993 MHLJ 1409
- Tarulata Devi v. Nikhil Bandhu Mishra, 1982 SCC Online Gau 35
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Revision No. 391 of 2019 (arising out of P.S. Case – Year 0, District Siwan)
Case Title: Nand Jee Singh & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
Citation: 2025 (3) PLJR 778
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jitendra Kumar
Date of Judgment: 20.02.2025
Advocates:
- For the Petitioners: Mr. Ravindra Kumar Singh, Advocate
- For the State: Mr. Chandra Sen Prasad Singh, APP
- For Opposite Party Nos. 2 to 5: Mr. Udit Narayan Singh, Advocate
Nature of the Case: Criminal revision challenging an order passed in a criminal revision (Criminal Revision No. 44 of 2001) arising from proceedings under Section 145 CrPC.
Link to Full Judgment: Patna High Court Judgment
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