Case Background
The case arose from an incident in the night between 13 and 14 August 1993 in Munger district. The accused was the second husband of the deceased woman, who was also known by two names in the record. The couple was living as tenants in a portion of the house of one prosecution witness at Chhoti Kelabari, under Kotwali Police Station, Munger.
According to the prosecution version, the accused was short-tempered and used to quarrel with his wife frequently. On the night of the incident, around 8.00 p.m., he allegedly started beating her and then took an axe from the house and gave a blow on her neck. She suffered a bleeding injury on the neck.
Despite this serious injury, she somehow reached Sadar Hospital, Munger, for treatment. At about 1.30 a.m. on 14 August 1993, an Assistant Police Inspector from Kotwali Police Station recorded her statement at the hospital. On the basis of that statement, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered at around the same time. The woman died later on the same day.
After her death, Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was added in the case diary. Inquest was conducted on the dead body and it was sent for post-mortem examination, which was carried out by a Civil Assistant Surgeon, examined at trial as P.W.6.
The investigation continued and statements of witnesses were recorded. A charge-sheet was filed against the accused. The Additional Sessions Judge-VII, Munger, framed a charge under Section 302 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
The prosecution examined nine witnesses. The defence was one of total denial. Relying mainly on the statement recorded at the hospital, which later came to be treated as a dying declaration, the trial court convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment on 03.07.1995 in Sessions Case No.562 of 1993.
The accused challenged this conviction and sentence before the Patna High Court by way of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.240 of 1995.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Division Bench of the Patna High Court, comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice A. M. Badar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar, heard the appeal. The primary question before the Court was whether the conviction could safely rest on the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased at Sadar Hospital at 1.30 a.m. on 14.08.1993.
The appointed advocate for the appellant argued that the entire prosecution case depended on this single piece of evidence. He submitted that the so-called dying declaration was neither trustworthy nor reliable. The injury was on the neck, the deceased died within a short period, and there was no medical certification that she was fit to speak. It was argued that in such a state she could not have given a long, detailed statement.
He also pointed out that the evidence of P.W.3, a neighbour and advocate by profession, cast serious doubt on the prosecution story, and that P.W.4 (the landlord) and P.W.5 (his wife) had turned hostile and did not support the case.
The Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, supported the trial court’s decision. He submitted that the dying declaration clearly showed the involvement of the accused, who was with the deceased at the time of the occurrence. According to him, the appeal deserved dismissal.
The High Court examined the oral and documentary evidence on record, focusing particularly on the hospital statement (Exhibit 3) recorded by P.W.8, Assistant Police Sub Inspector Sushil Kumar Khanna. The Court noted that after the death of the woman, this FIR was elevated to the status of a dying declaration.
The Bench restated the legal position under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Statements made by a person as to the cause of their death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in their death become relevant when the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are an exception to the rule against hearsay but must be carefully scrutinised.
The Court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Jayamma and another versus State of Karnataka, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 213. That judgment had reviewed the governing principles on appreciation of dying declarations, including the earlier decision in Sham Shankar Kankaria versus State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165. The Supreme Court held, among other things, that:
there is no rule that a dying declaration must be corroborated; it can by itself form the basis of conviction if found true and voluntary; the Court must ensure the statement is not a result of tutoring or imagination; and where a dying declaration appears suspicious or infirm, it should not be acted upon without corroboration.
Applying these principles, the Patna High Court first looked closely at the text of Exhibit 3. The Court found that it was a full-page handwritten document in which the deceased was stated to have given detailed particulars about herself, her husband, the rented house, and the full addresses of her parental and matrimonial homes. She was also recorded as saying that she was making the statement at 1.30 a.m. at Sadar Hospital in front of the “Jamadar Saheb” of Kotwali Police Station, that her husband used to beat her, that he assaulted her with an axe on the neck at 8.00 p.m., that no one else was present in the house, that she somehow reached the hospital, and that he did so with the intention to commit her murder.
The Court observed that the declaration contained minute and elaborate details not normally expected even from a person in normal mental condition, let alone someone with a deep neck injury and heavy blood loss. The format of the statement, with repetitive address details and legal-style language about “intention to commit murder”, resembled the way police generally draft statements, rather than the natural words of a dying person.
The Bench therefore found the declaration artificial in nature, casting serious doubt on whether it was genuinely dictated by the deceased or was instead written by the police officer based on his own understanding of the facts. The repeated reference to the place, time, and presence of the police officer himself suggested his strong influence over the statement.
The Court then turned to the question whether the deceased was medically and physically in a condition to give such a lengthy, coherent statement. It noted that P.W.8 admitted in cross-examination that he did not approach the attending medical officer to check whether the patient was conscious, oriented and capable of giving a statement, especially in light of a neck injury caused by an axe blow.
P.W.8 also did not examine the medical treatment papers to see if sedatives had been administered, and he did not record the statement in a question-and-answer form to test her alertness. In other words, there was nothing on record to show that the deceased was fit to make a dying declaration when Exhibit 3 was recorded.
The medical evidence of P.W.6, the autopsy surgeon, further deepened this doubt. During post-mortem, he found a 2 inch by 1 inch incised wound on the right side of the neck, with blood and clots present. The internal examination showed that blood vessels and soft tissues beneath the wound were cut in a circle. In his cross-examination, he stated that looking at the seriousness of the injury, even a lay person would say that it would certainly cause death.
In such a situation, the Court held it was very difficult to conclude that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state, both physically and mentally, to make a full-page detailed statement at 1.30 a.m. The prosecution did not examine any treating doctor or other medical expert to support the claim that she was fit to speak at that time.
The Bench then checked whether there was any independent evidence to support the version in the alleged dying declaration, especially about the presence of the accused at the scene.
P.W.3, the neighbour and advocate, deposed that the accused was, by relation, the brother of the deceased, and that the name of her husband was someone else. He said he had seen the accused visiting the tenanted house but clearly stated that on the day of the incident he did not see the accused at the place of the deceased. Although he acted as a panch witness for seizure of footwear and bloodstained earth from the tenanted house, his evidence did not connect the accused with the actual occurrence.
P.W.4, the landlord, turned hostile. He said he did not know how his tenant died and that she was not living with the accused. His wife, P.W.5, also did not support the prosecution story in any way. No other witness provided evidence fixing the accused at the spot at the relevant time.
In these circumstances, the Court observed that the entire case against the accused rested solely on the doubtful dying declaration. While in law a conviction can be based on a solitary dying declaration, that is permissible only when the Court is satisfied of its truthfulness and reliability.
For the reasons discussed, the Bench held that Exhibit 3 failed to pass the test of reliability and could not be used as the sole foundation for conviction. It further remarked that the trial court had misread the evidence and misunderstood the law on appreciation of dying declarations. The trial court’s view that P.W.8 might not have anticipated the immediate death of the woman, and therefore naturally did not seek a doctor’s or magistrate’s help, was termed perverse because P.W.8 never stated any such thing in evidence.
Consequently, the Patna High Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the judgment and order dated 03.07.1995 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-VII, Munger, in Sessions Case No.562 of 1993 convicting the accused under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The accused was acquitted of the charge and his bail bond was discharged.
The Court also recorded its appreciation of the efforts of the amicus curiae and directed that his fee of Rs.5,000/- be paid by the High Court Legal Services Authority.
Why This Judgment Matters
This decision is important for criminal cases where the prosecution relies solely on a dying declaration. The Patna High Court has shown that such a statement cannot be accepted blindly just because it is recorded by the police or because it is the last statement of the victim.
For families of both victims and accused persons, the judgment underlines that courts will look for signs that the person was truly in a condition to speak, that the words used were likely their own, and that there is no artificial or police-style drafting.
Where medical evidence shows very serious injuries and heavy blood loss, and there is no proof that the patient was conscious and fit to speak, a long, detailed statement recorded without the doctor’s involvement may not be enough to send someone to prison for life.
The ruling also reinforces that trial courts must carefully apply Supreme Court guidelines on dying declarations and not overlook gaps in evidence. This helps in preventing wrongful convictions based on weak or suspicious statements.
Legal Issues and Answers
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Issue: Can the accused be convicted for murder under Section 302 IPC solely on the basis of the statement recorded at the hospital as a dying declaration?
Answer: No. The Patna High Court held that the declaration was doubtful and not shown to be made when the deceased was medically fit. It was too elaborate, appeared artificially drafted, and lacked independent corroboration. Therefore it could not be the sole basis for conviction. -
Issue: Did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was present at the place of occurrence and assaulted the deceased with an axe?
Answer: No. The neighbour did not see the accused at the spot on the day of the incident, the landlord and his wife turned hostile, and no other evidence linked the accused to the scene. Hence, presence and participation of the accused were not proved.
Cases Cited by the Court
- The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Jayamma and another versus State of Karnataka, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 213, which in turn referred to Sham Shankar Kankaria versus State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165, and several other Supreme Court judgments on dying declarations.
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (DB) No.240 of 1995
Case Title: Balmiki Prasad Chourasia v. The State of Bihar
Citation: 2022(1) PLJR 361
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice A. M. Badar; Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar
Date of Judgment: 09.12.2021
Advocates:
- Mr. Amish Kumar, Amicus Curiae, for the appellant
- Mr. Ajay Mishra, A.P.P., for the State
Nature of the Case: Criminal appeal (Division Bench) against conviction and life sentence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-VII, Munger, in Sessions Case No.562 of 1993.
Link to the Judgment: Patna High Court Judgment
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