Case Background
The case began with Sultanganj P.S. Case No. 171 of 2016, registered on 22 August 2016 in Patna district. The FIR was based on a farde bayan given by the father of a minor girl, about 13 years old at that time.
According to the father, his daughter had been staying in Sultanganj at the house of a person referred to as “Guddun Ji” and doing small household work. About five months before lodging the FIR, she left that house for one night, returned the next morning, but refused to tell her father where she had gone.
About one month before lodging the FIR, the father noticed physical changes in his daughter. Initially she did not explain these changes. On 22 August 2016, she told him that she was pregnant and alleged that one Md. Pappu (the present appellant) had taken her to Darbhanga on a motorcycle about five months earlier and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her.
She further stated that the appellant brought her back the next morning to the house of “Guddun Ji”. Out of fear, she did not tell her father. Her mother was mentally ill, so there was no occasion to inform her either. She also alleged that even after the Darbhanga incident, the appellant continued to have sexual intercourse with her by putting her under fear.
The FIR also recorded that a barber named Chhotu Thakur saw the physical relationship between the appellant and the victim and then, taking advantage of the situation, also committed penetrative sexual assault upon her.
The investigation was entrusted to S.I. Bharti Kumari of Mahila Police Station, Patna. She visited the place of occurrence, recorded statements of witnesses, got the victim’s statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., arranged her medical examination, collected the medical report and finally submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 376 IPC read with Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, on finding the case to be exclusively triable by the Special Judge under the POCSO Act, committed it to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Patna-cum-Special Judge (POCSO).
The trial court framed charges under Section 376 IPC and Sections 4/6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined five witnesses, including the victim, her father and the doctor. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the defence.
By judgment dated 29 September 2018, followed by order of sentence dated 5 October 2018, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced him to imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. Eighty per cent of any realised fine was to go to the victim. In view of Section 4 of the POCSO Act, no separate sentence was passed under Section 376 IPC.
The appellant challenged the correctness of this conviction and sentence through Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 14 of 2019 before the Patna High Court.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Division Bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ansul closely examined the evidence recorded by the trial court, along with the legal provisions and precedents relied on.
P.W.1, the manager of Saddam Marriage Hall at Sultanganj where the appellant worked as an electrician, stated that he did not know the daughter of the informant and denied making any statement to the police. The prosecution did not declare him hostile. The High Court noted that his evidence did not support the prosecution version at all.
P.W.2, the victim’s father and informant, stated that his daughter was about 13 years old at the time of the incident. He deposed that he heard from his daughter that the appellant had committed “galat kaam” with her, after which he went to the police station and gave his statement. He also mentioned that his daughter was medically examined and that she gave birth to a baby who died five days after birth.
However, during cross-examination, he admitted that he did not know any “Chhotu Thakur” and denied having told the police that Chhotu had committed “nazayaz kaam” with his daughter. The High Court observed that his evidence was hearsay in nature, as he only repeated what he had heard from his daughter, and that he denied parts of the version recorded in the FIR.
P.W.3, the victim herself, deposed on 3 February 2018. Before recording her testimony, the trial judge made a brief note in Hindi that her understanding had been tested and found proper so her statement was recorded. The High Court held that this noting did not reflect full compliance with Section 118 of the Evidence Act. In the case of a child witness, the judge should record questions and answers showing mental capacity and understanding, which was not done. The Court termed the recording “irregular”, though not wholly illegal.
In her deposition, the victim stated that about one and a half years prior to her evidence the appellant had taken her to Darbhanga and committed “ganda ganda kaam” with her, as a result of which she became pregnant. She stated that her father was a painter and that she lived with her mother and elder sister. In cross-examination, she denied knowing any person named Chhotu Thakur and denied that Chhotu had committed any illicit act with her. She also confirmed that Chhotu had a barber shop nearby but had closed it and fled after the case was instituted.
The High Court compared this with the earlier versions. In the FIR, the father had clearly accused both the appellant and Chhotu of sexual assault. Further, the FIR placed the Darbhanga incident about five months prior to 22 August 2016 (around late February or March 2016), whereas the victim’s oral evidence and Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement broadly indicated that the incident took place about five months before the FIR without clear dating. The Court found a “glaring factual discrepancy” between these versions, with no explanation as to why the allegations against Chhotu disappeared during trial.
The victim’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. also recorded that the appellant took her to Gandhi Maidan on 14 August 2016 and that on another occasion he took her to Darbhanga at night and committed “ganda kaam”. She said she raised alarm but no one heard, and that she was about five months pregnant. She also said that whenever her father was absent from home, the appellant would come and commit similar acts.
P.W.4, Dr. Premlata Verma, medically examined the victim on 23 August 2016 at Guru Govind Singh Hospital, Patna City. Her report noted that the victim had developed secondary sexual characteristics, there was abdominal swelling three fingers above the umbilicus, and there were no injury marks on the body including private parts. Per vaginal examination showed that the vagina admitted two fingers easily.
The X-ray reports from PMCH showed that the victim’s age was between 14 and 16.5 years. Ultrasound examination revealed a single intrauterine foetus with cardiac activity, of a composite age of 23 weeks and 2 days. A microbiology report indicated that spermatozoa were not found on the vaginal smear. The High Court accepted that the victim was a minor and pregnant at the time, but noted that these findings did not by themselves identify the person responsible.
P.W.5, the Investigating Officer, was examined but the High Court noted nothing significant from her evidence that directly linked the appellant beyond the already shaky testimonies.
On behalf of the appellant, counsel argued that the conviction was based mainly on the testimony of the victim and the medical evidence, but that the victim’s evidence was not of “sterling” quality as required by Supreme Court decisions such as Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, and Nirmal Premkumar and Anr. v. State Rep. By Inspector of Police, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 260. They stressed the inconsistencies regarding the role of Chhotu Thakur and the timing of events, and the absence of medical examination of the accused under Section 53A Cr.P.C.
The State supported the conviction, arguing that the minor’s pregnancy, her consistent allegation of sexual assault by the appellant, and the applicability of POCSO were sufficient. The State urged that the trial court had rightly relied on legal presumptions and on precedents like State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 421, and Rafiq v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 559, which allow conviction on the sole testimony of the victim if found reliable.
The High Court first reiterated settled principles: the testimony of a victim of sexual assault can by itself sustain conviction if it is reliable and trustworthy; medical evidence is important for assessing such testimony; and medical examination of the accused is mandatory under Section 53A Cr.P.C. in sexual offence cases, particularly where DNA profiling may be needed.
The Bench expressed serious concern that in Bihar, Section 53A Cr.P.C. appeared to be a “forgotten provision”. In this case, the appellant had been arrested on the same day the FIR was lodged, yet there was no medical examination of him. The Court noted that without such examination, if an accused later claimed impotence, the Court would have no medical material to contradict that claim. The judges stressed the need to sensitise the police to ensure immediate medical examination of the accused in such cases.
The Court then examined whether the victim’s testimony could be treated as that of a “sterling witness” as defined in Rai Sandeep. Applying that test, the Bench identified several reasons for doubt:
First, neither the victim nor the informant was able to give even an approximate date and time of the first incident at Darbhanga.
Second, the Investigating Officer did not visit the place of occurrence at Darbhanga at all.
Third, although the medical evidence showed that the victim was about five months pregnant when the FIR was lodged, there was no clear and consistent account from the victim as to when, where and by whom the conception occurred.
Fourth, the FIR had clearly named Chhotu Thakur as another assailant, yet during evidence both the victim and her father denied or avoided that allegation without explanation, even though Chhotu reportedly locked his shop and fled after the FIR.
Fifth, no steps were taken by the Investigating Officer to scientifically determine whether the pregnancy could be attributed to the appellant or to Chhotu, for example by DNA profiling.
Because of these deficiencies, the Court held that the evidence of the victim and her father was not of the “sterling” quality that would allow conviction solely on that basis. The foundational facts of the prosecution case had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court had relied on presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. The High Court referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Subrata Biswas & Anr. v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 1815, which clarified that these presumptions apply only after the prosecution first proves the basic facts of the offence. The words “is prosecuted” do not relieve the prosecution from proving the primary facts through reliable evidence. Otherwise, the law would become constitutionally suspect.
Applying this reasoning, the Patna High Court held that, since the foundational facts were not established, the POCSO presumptions could not be invoked against the appellant. Consequently, the conviction could not be sustained.
The Court therefore set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29 September 2018 and 5 October 2018. It allowed the appeal and directed that, if the appellant was in jail, he be released forthwith, unless required in any other case. The lower court records were ordered to be sent back.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for families, police officers and lawyers dealing with POCSO and rape cases in Bihar.
First, it shows that even in very serious offences, the Court will not uphold a conviction if key facts are unclear, witnesses change their versions, or investigation is incomplete. A minor’s pregnancy alone is not enough; the law still requires clear proof about who is responsible.
Second, the Patna High Court has strongly reminded the police to use Section 53A Cr.P.C. and conduct timely medical examination of the accused in sexual offence cases. Without this, later claims and doubts cannot be properly addressed.
Third, the ruling explains that the special presumptions under the POCSO Act do not mean automatic conviction. The prosecution must first prove the basic story with reliable evidence. Only then does the burden shift to the accused.
For victims and their families, the decision highlights the need to give consistent statements and to cooperate with a thorough investigation. For accused persons, it underlines that courts will insist on strict proof before confirming a conviction carrying life imprisonment.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Could the appellant’s conviction under Section 376 IPC and Sections 4/6 POCSO be sustained mainly on the victim’s testimony and medical evidence, despite inconsistencies and gaps in investigation?
Answer: No. The Patna High Court held that the victim’s and informant’s evidence was not of sterling quality, foundational facts were not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore the conviction could not stand. - Issue: Do the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act relieve the prosecution from proving the basic facts of the alleged offence?
Answer: No. The Court, relying on Subrata Biswas & Anr. v. State, held that the prosecution must first prove the foundational facts; only then do POCSO presumptions and the reverse burden on the accused come into play. - Issue: What is the effect of not conducting medical examination of the accused under Section 53A Cr.P.C. in a sexual offence case?
Answer: The Court held that such omission is a serious lapse. Section 53A is obligatory and necessary to establish the capability of the accused and to support DNA profiling where required. Its non-use weakened the prosecution case here.
Cases Cited by the Court
- State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 421
- Rafiq v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 559
- Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21
- Nirmal Premkumar and Anr. v. State Rep. By Inspector of Police, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 260
- Santosh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443
- Subrata Biswas & Anr. v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 1815
- Sukumar Jana v. The State of Bihar, Cr. APP (DB) 304 of 2021, Patna High Court, judgment dated 6 December 2023
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 14 of 2019, arising out of Sultanganj P.S. Case No. 171 of 2016
Case Title: Md. Pappu @ Md. Saba Uddin v. The State of Bihar
Citation: 2024(2) PLJR 564
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ansul
Advocates: Mr. Madhav Raj, Advocate; Mr. Vikash Kumar Jha, Advocate; Mr. Abhinav Kumar, Advocate; Mr. Kumar Ashish, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Abhimanyu Sharma, APP for the State.
Nature of the Case: Criminal appeal (Division Bench) against judgment of conviction and order of sentence in a Special POCSO case arising from allegations under Section 376 IPC read with Sections 4/6 of the POCSO Act.
Date of High Court Judgment: 03 February 2026
Trial Court: Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Patna-cum-Special Judge under POCSO Act, in Special Case No. 122 of 2016
Impugned Orders: Judgment of conviction dated 29 September 2018 and order of sentence dated 5 October 2018
Final Outcome: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant directed to be released if not required in any other case.
Link to Judgment: Click here to read the full Patna High Court judgment
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