Case Background
The petitioner joined the Bihar Judicial Service as a Judicial Magistrate at Darbhanga on 1 April 1975, after selection through the 22nd Combined Competitive Examination (15th Judicial Service) conducted by the Bihar Public Service Commission. In March 1990, he was promoted to the Bihar Superior Judicial Service and posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur.
He was confirmed in the Superior Judicial Service with effect from 19 October 1992 and was granted Selection Grade with retrospective effect from 1 February 1997. Later he became District and Sessions Judge in 2001, then Member Secretary of the Bihar State Law Commission, and thereafter the first Director of the Bihar Judicial Officers’ Training Institute, Patna (now Bihar Judicial Academy).
While he was Director of the Training Institute, a complaint was sent by one Md. Azhar to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. The complainant alleged that the petitioner was abusing his position as a senior judicial officer to pressurise the local administration and judicial officers in East Champaran in relation to a serious land dispute which had led to five deaths and multiple injuries, giving rise to Turkauliya P.S. Case No. 318 of 2005.
On receiving this complaint, the High Court sought a report from the then District and Sessions Judge, East Champaran, Motihari. The District Judge reported that the petitioner had met him three times at his official residence and also spoken telephonically, requesting him to help in the criminal case and to influence the District Magistrate, East Champaran, Motihari to pass favourable orders about approximately 75 bighas of disputed land.
On 6 July 2006, the Standing Committee of the Patna High Court resolved to place the petitioner under suspension in anticipation of a departmental proceeding, and to treat his headquarters as the Civil Courts. This suspension was communicated via memo no. 6631-33 dated 10 July 2006. In the same meeting, the Standing Committee recalled his inclusion in the list of officers given Super Time Scale under notification no. 233A dated 23 June 2006. This recall was notified by memo no. 6643-47 dated 11 July 2006.
A charge memo was then issued to him under memo no. 9925 dated 25 September 2006. The main charge was that, while posted as Director, Judicial Officers’ Training Institute, Patna, he tried to use his office to influence the District Judge, Motihari and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Motihari in relation to the land dispute and Turkauliya P.S. Case No. 318 of 2005, where he had been named as a conspirator in a protest petition.
The petitioner challenged his suspension and the departmental proceeding in CWJC No. 5500 of 2007, and separately challenged the recall of his Super Time Scale in CWJC No. 13586 of 2006. On 30 April 2008, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court allowed both writ petitions, quashing the suspension, the departmental proceeding, and the recall of the Super Time Scale.
In compliance, the Standing Committee revoked his suspension and dropped the departmental proceeding on 20 May 2008, subject to the High Court’s intention to file appeals. He was then posted as Principal Judge, Family Court, Katihar, where he took charge on 7 August 2008.
On the administrative side, the High Court filed Special Leave Petitions (SLP (C) Nos. 12618 of 2008 and 22890 of 2008) before the Supreme Court against the High Court’s orders. On 19 September 2008, the Supreme Court granted an interim stay. On 3 October 2008, while disposing of the SLPs, the Supreme Court made the interim stay absolute and directed the Patna High Court to complete the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner within four weeks, ordering that he remain under suspension till then.
Following these directions, the petitioner was again placed under suspension by order dated 15 October 2008, now from the post of Principal Judge, Family Court. The departmental enquiry re-commenced on 22 December 2008.
During this period, he continued under suspension and ultimately retired on 31 October 2009. After his retirement, the Standing Committee resolved on 10 November 2009 to continue the disciplinary proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950. This conversion was notified via memo no. 17602 dated 16 November 2009.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The enquiry officer recorded evidence of three key witnesses: the District and Sessions Judge, East Champaran, Motihari; the complainant, Md. Azhar; and the District Magistrate, East Champaran, Motihari. After the prosecution evidence closed on 11 December 2009, the petitioner filed his written defence on 21 December 2009. His defence denied pressurising any authority and claimed that he had no connection with the land dispute, alleging conspiracy and bias by the District Judge.
The District Judge’s evidence, and his earlier report, were crucial. He testified that the petitioner had come to his official residence three times and contacted him by phone, asking him to help in the land dispute and to use his influence with the District Magistrate. The enquiry officer noted that although the petitioner cross-examined the District Judge on several aspects, he did not put a single question to him about these personal meetings. The High Court later treated this silence during cross-examination as a strong indication that the District Judge’s account was credible and not biased.
The complainant, Md. Azhar, was also examined. He stated that because the petitioner held a high judicial post, he felt compelled to send a petition to the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The enquiry report recorded that the petitioner put over 180 questions to Azhar in cross-examination, many of them focused on the details of the disputed land. For the enquiry officer, this extensive questioning contradicted the petitioner’s claim that he had nothing to do with the land and showed that he had deep knowledge and involvement in the dispute.
The District Magistrate, East Champaran, Motihari, was the third key witness. He confirmed that there were several orders in favour of the petitioner’s family regarding the land, yet they had not been able to take possession. The petitioner’s brother then filed a petition before the District Magistrate, asking for posting of a Magistrate and police force so that the land could be cultivated. The original files were produced and examined. The petitioner attempted to question the authenticity of the documents allegedly submitted by his brother, but the District Magistrate’s evidence in support of these documents could not be shaken.
On the basis of this material, the enquiry officer concluded that the petitioner and his family wanted to secure possession of the disputed land, and that he had attempted to use his office as a senior judicial officer to exert pressure on the District Magistrate through the District Judge. When these efforts did not succeed, the family tried to take possession on their own, which led to the violent incident resulting in five deaths and several injuries.
The enquiry officer further held that the petitioner had approached the District Judge for help in a personal land dispute, blurring the line between a purely family matter and his official position as a judicial officer. In doing so, he failed to maintain the dignity and prestige of the high office he held.
After the enquiry report was submitted on 30 July 2010, the registry, on the Standing Committee’s decision dated 10 August 2010, supplied a copy of the report to the petitioner and issued office letter no. 12214 dated 20 August 2010, asking him to show cause why the report should not be accepted and why action should not be taken under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950.
The petitioner filed his reply on 6 September 2010, raising several objections. He attacked the complaint as vague, argued that no specific dates and times of meetings with the District Judge or Chief Judicial Magistrate were given, denied any attempt to influence the District Magistrate, and claimed that the complainant himself was an accused and could not have filed a complaint. He also repeated his allegation of conspiracy by the District Judge and argued that the High Court on its administrative side lacked jurisdiction over him while he was on deputation to the State Government.
The Standing Committee considered the enquiry record and his reply. In its meeting dated 21 September 2010 it resolved, in exercise of powers under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, to withhold 5% of his pension and to treat the entire suspension period as suspension only. This was formally communicated by memo no. 14452 dated 25 September 2010.
The petitioner filed an appeal against this punishment, but the appellate authority rejected it under memo no. 18567 dated 6 December 2010. He then filed the present writ petitions: CWJC No. 4937 of 2011 challenging the pension cut, suspension treatment and related pensionary benefits; and CWJC No. 4749 of 2011 challenging the recall of his Super Time Scale.
The Patna High Court, speaking through Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Roy (for the Bench also comprising Hon’ble the Chief Justice), addressed each of his grounds.
First, on the allegation of conspiracy and bias by the District Judge, the Court noted that the petitioner never questioned the District Judge in cross-examination about the alleged three visits to his residence. Given this, the Court accepted the enquiry officer’s view that the report and testimony of the District Judge could not be regarded as biased.
Second, his claim that he had no connection with the land was rejected. The Court referred to the enquiry officer’s observation that the petitioner had asked approximately 180 questions to Md. Azhar about the land, which showed detailed knowledge. The District Magistrate’s documents about petitions from the petitioner’s brother seeking Magistrate and police help to take possession also confirmed the family’s active pursuit of the land.
Third, the Court examined his jurisdiction objection, that as he was on deputation to the State Government, the High Court could not suspend him or initiate departmental proceedings. The Court recorded that this very contention had been accepted earlier in CWJC No. 5500 of 2007, but that decision had been set aside in effect when the Supreme Court, in the SLPs, made the stay absolute and directed that the High Court itself complete the departmental proceedings, keeping him under suspension. Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (AIR 1966 SC 447), the Bench reiterated that “control” in Article 235 of the Constitution includes disciplinary control and that such control over the subordinate judiciary vests in the High Court. It held that even while the petitioner was on deputation, he continued to be a member of the Bihar Superior Judicial Service, and the Patna High Court retained full disciplinary power over him.
Fourth, on the argument that the proceeding could not continue under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules because no specific finding of “grave misconduct” or “pecuniary loss” was recorded, the Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Shambhu Saran v. State of Bihar, 2000 (1) PLJR 665. That judgment clarified that where a departmental proceeding has already been initiated before retirement, it can continue after retirement under Rule 43(b) without any fresh order, and that the safeguards mentioned in the rule apply only where no proceeding was pending at the time of retirement. The Bench held that the petitioner’s enquiry had already started before he retired; therefore, it validly continued as a Rule 43(b) proceeding. The Court also held that, given the nature of the proved charges—using the office of a senior judge to try to influence the administration for personal gain—this clearly amounted to grave misconduct even if those words were not expressly used in the final order.
Fifth, the petitioner contended that the punishment order and appellate order were “non-speaking” and therefore bad in law. The Court noted that the disciplinary authority had agreed with the enquiry officer’s findings and was not required to reappraise evidence or give detailed reasons again when concurring. For this proposition, it referred to the Supreme Court decision in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279, which explains that reasons are mandatory when the disciplinary authority or appellate authority disagrees with the enquiry officer, or directs fresh enquiry, but not when they simply concur after applying their mind.
Sixth, the Court considered his plea for full salary and allowances for the suspension period. Given that the charges were proved and he was punished, the Bench held that he was not entitled to full salary for the suspension period. The Court also noted that his later suspension, on the Supreme Court’s directions, was from the post of Principal Judge, Family Court, which is a judicial post, not a deputation post. Since he was found guilty and not exonerated, he could not claim back wages for the suspension period.
Seventh, on the challenge to recall of his Super Time Scale (CWJC No. 4749 of 2011), the Court held that once he had been found guilty of serious misconduct and punished, he could not insist on enjoying a higher scale of pay. The Court referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109, especially paragraph 29, to underline that an employee cannot demand promotion or higher scale retrospectively when, for conduct during that period, he is later penalised. Promotion is not a right; only consideration for promotion is. An unblemished record is a minimum requirement, and once he had been punished, he did not satisfy that standard.
The Court also observed that the earlier Patna High Court order setting aside recall of the Super Time Scale (CWJC No. 13586 of 2006) stood effectively reversed because the Supreme Court, in SLP (C) No. 23747 of 2008 along with SLP (C) No. 22890 of 2008, allowed the High Court’s appeals. Therefore, the petitioner could not now re-open the recall of Super Time Scale; any claim to that effect was untenable.
After examining all these aspects, the Bench concluded that the departmental proceeding and the punishment order suffered from no illegality or procedural irregularity. It held that the petitioner was guilty of the charge and therefore not entitled either to full pension or to the Super Time Scale.
However, while upholding the legal correctness of the 5% pension cut, the Court showed limited leniency. It observed that the order of permanent deduction of 5% of pension could be given “a second look” by respondent no. 2 (the Patna High Court, through its Registrar General). It allowed the petitioner to submit a fresh representation within four weeks, which the authority must consider and decide by passing an appropriate order at the earliest.
In the final result, CWJC No. 4937 of 2011 was disposed of with this liberty regarding reconsideration of the quantum or permanence of the pension cut, and CWJC No. 4749 of 2011 was dismissed outright.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for serving and retired government employees, especially judicial officers, who may face departmental proceedings even close to retirement. It makes it clear that if a disciplinary enquiry is started while an officer is still in service, it can continue under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules after retirement, and pensionary benefits can be cut if grave misconduct is proved.
For judicial officers on deputation to government bodies or commissions, the ruling reinforces that the Patna High Court retains full control and disciplinary authority under Article 235 of the Constitution. Deputation does not shield an officer from enquiry by the High Court for misuse of judicial office.
The decision also shows that courts will not lightly interfere with disciplinary findings when proper enquiry has been held and the disciplinary and appellate authorities have applied their mind. Allegations of bias and conspiracy must be supported by cross-examination and evidence, not just bare claims.
Finally, the judgment highlights that higher pay scales and promotions such as Super Time Scale are not automatic rights. An officer whose conduct is found to be blameworthy cannot insist on such benefits, even if he had earlier been granted them and later lost them because of disciplinary action. At the same time, the Court kept a small window open for humanitarian reconsideration of the extent of pension cut.
Legal Issues and Answers
Issue: Could the Patna High Court initiate and continue disciplinary proceedings, and keep the petitioner under suspension, while he was on deputation and even after his retirement?
Answer: Yes. The Court held that under Article 235 of the Constitution the High Court has full disciplinary control over judicial officers, including those on deputation. An enquiry validly initiated before retirement can automatically continue under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules.
Issue: Were the punishment of withholding 5% of pension and treating the suspension period as such liable to be quashed for lack of reasons or for absence of an express finding of “grave misconduct” or “pecuniary loss” in the final order?
Answer: No. Since the disciplinary authority agreed with the enquiry officer’s findings of serious misuse of office, it was not required to re-write detailed reasons. The nature of the proved charge itself amounted to grave misconduct within Rule 43(b), even if those words were not expressly used.
Issue: Was the petitioner entitled to restoration of his Super Time Scale and full salary for the suspension period?
Answer: No. The Court held that a clean record is essential for such higher benefits. Once serious misconduct was proved and punishment imposed, he could not claim Super Time Scale or back salary. Denial of these benefits was a natural consequence of his conduct, not an additional penalty.
Cases Cited by the Court
- State of West Bengal & Anr. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447
- Shambhu Saran v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2000 (1) PLJR 665 (Full Bench, Patna High Court)
- State Bank of Bikaner, Jaipur & Ors. v. Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279
- Union of India & Ors. v. K.V. Jankiraman & Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 109
Case Details
Case Numbers: CWJC No. 4937 of 2011; CWJC No. 4749 of 2011
Case Title: Vikas Kumar Sharma v. The State of Bihar & Ors. (in both writ petitions)
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Coram: Hon’ble the Chief Justice; Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Roy
Judgment Date: 1 February 2024
Citation: 2024 (1) PLJR 848
Advocates:
- For the petitioner: Mr. Nand Kishore Singh, Advocate
- For the respondents (State of Bihar and Patna High Court): Mr. Piyush Lall, Advocate
Nature of the Case: Civil Writ Jurisdiction cases under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging (i) disciplinary punishment and pension cut under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950, and (ii) recall of grant of Super Time Scale pay.
Final Outcome: CWJC No. 4937 of 2011 disposed of with liberty to seek reconsideration of the quantum/permanence of pension cut; CWJC No. 4749 of 2011 dismissed; findings of misconduct, pension cut, treatment of suspension period, and recall of Super Time Scale all upheld.
Link to Judgment: Click here to read the full judgment of the Patna High Court
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