Case Background
The dispute arose out of an arbitral award dated 25.04.2022 passed against an insurance company. Feeling aggrieved by that award, the insurer decided to challenge it under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The insurer filed Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case No.115 of 2022 before the District Judge, Patna on 30.08.2022. The court staff (Sheristedar) reported that there was a delay of 37 days beyond the normal limitation period for filing such a challenge.
When the matter came up before the District Judge, no one appeared on behalf of the insurer. The District Judge heard counsel for the opposite party and examined the record. Holding that the delay of 37 days exceeded the maximum 30 days that can be condoned under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the District Judge dismissed the Section 34 petition as barred by limitation on 22.03.2024.
The insurer then filed Commercial Appeal No.5 of 2024 before the Patna High Court, challenging this dismissal order. During the appeal, it was informed that respondent no.2 (the TPA company) was not a necessary party and notice to it was not required.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The core question before the Patna High Court was simple but very important: from which date should the limitation be counted for filing a petition under Section 34 to set aside an arbitral award?
The appellant insurer argued that the District Judge misunderstood the statutory scheme. Relying on Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the appellant stressed that a signed copy of the arbitral award must be delivered to each party. Under Section 34(3), the three-month limitation period to challenge the award begins from “the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award.”
According to the appellant, these two provisions must be read together. Only when the party itself receives the signed copy of the award can the limitation clock start.
The arbitral tribunal had stated in the award that after signing, a copy of the signed award was being delivered to the claimant and the respondents by registered post and also by email to the advocates of both sides. However, a supplementary affidavit before the High Court clarified that the registered post containing the signed award reached the office of the insurer only on 01.06.2022.
On this basis, the insurer argued that limitation should be counted from 01.06.2022. If that date is taken as the starting point, the Section 34 petition filed on 30.08.2022 would fall within the three-month period and therefore be in time, without any need to condone delay.
On the other hand, respondent no.1 (the hospital) opposed the appeal. Its counsel drew the High Court’s attention to the insurer’s own application under Section 34(3) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, filed before the District Judge seeking condonation of delay.
In paragraph 3 of that application, the insurer had stated that after preparation, the award was made over by the arbitrator’s office to the counsel, who then perused it, gave his opinion, and sent it to the Patna office of the insurer. After internal deliberation, the Patna office referred the matter to the head office.
Respondent no.1 argued that this itself showed that the copy of the award had already been received and examined by the insurer’s lawyer, and then reached the insurer’s office. The limitation period should therefore be taken from the date when the lawyer received the award, not from 01.06.2022.
Further, in paragraph 14 of the condonation application, the insurer had admitted that there was delay in filing and pleaded for condonation to avoid irreparable loss. Respondent no.1 relied on these admissions to say that even the insurer treated its petition as delayed.
To support its legal stand, respondent no.1 cited the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Department of Ports, Government of India Vs. Ernst and Young Pvt. Ltd. (now Ernst and Young LLP) and Another, reported as 2023:DHC:6055. There, a Single Judge had held that even receipt of a photocopy of a signed award from the arbitral tribunal is sufficient “delivery” under Section 31(5), and that the Arbitration Act does not require filing of an ink-signed copy under Section 34.
The Delhi High Court in that case had relied on its earlier decision in Continental Telepower Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1859. In paragraph 47 of the 2023 judgment, it was further held that delivery of a copy of the award through email is valid service under Section 31(5).
Based on these rulings, respondent no.1 argued that the email sent by the arbitrator’s office to the insurer’s advocate should be treated as delivery of the award to the “party” for the purpose of limitation. Thus, the Section 34 petition would be beyond time, and the District Judge’s order required no interference.
The Patna High Court carefully considered these rival submissions and the statutory provisions. It first noted the admitted facts. The arbitral award was signed on 25.04.2022. The arbitrator directed his office to send the signed copy by registered post to the parties and by email to their lawyers.
It was also accepted that the arbitral tribunal did not send the signed copy of the award by email directly to the parties themselves, only to their advocates. The registered post containing the award was received by respondent no.1 on 01.06.2022, and there was no dispute that the insurer also received the registered post on 01.06.2022, as shown by the supplementary affidavit which was not contested.
The real dispute, therefore, was whether sending the signed award by email to the insurer’s advocate and the advocate forwarding it, with his opinion, to the client could be treated as full compliance with Section 31(5), so that limitation would start from that earlier date.
To resolve this, the Patna High Court examined two Supreme Court decisions on the meaning of delivery of a signed award to a party: Union of India Vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239 and Benarsi Krishna Committee & Others Vs. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 9 SCC 496.
In Tecco Trichy, the Supreme Court had emphasised that delivery of the arbitral award under Section 31(5) is a matter of substance, not a mere formality. The award must be “received” by the party, and that receipt triggers limitation for different post-award remedies, including Section 34(3).
In that case, service of the award on the General Manager of Railways was held insufficient because the relevant officer dealing with the contract was the Chief Engineer. The Supreme Court held that limitation would start from the date the Chief Engineer received the award.
In Benarsi Krishna Committee, the Supreme Court directly addressed whether service of the award on an advocate amounted to service on the “party”. Referring to Section 2(1)(h), which defines “party” as a party to an arbitration agreement, the Court held that this term is not widened to include agents or advocates.
The Supreme Court clearly stated that any reference to “party” in Sections 31(5) and 34(3) means the party itself, not its lawyer. It drew a distinction between an advocate acting and pleading for a party in a proceeding and an advocate being treated as the party for purposes like delivery of a signed award.
Therefore, proper compliance with Section 31(5) requires that a signed copy of the arbitral award be delivered to the party itself. If the signed award is not delivered to the party, service on the advocate alone does not satisfy the statutory requirement and will not start the limitation period under Section 34(3).
The Patna High Court quoted paragraphs 15 and 16 of Benarsi Krishna Committee to reinforce that view. It noted that earlier decisions under the old Arbitration Act, 1940 (which did not contain a provision like Section 31(5)) could not be applied to the present statutory scheme.
In light of these binding Supreme Court decisions, the Patna High Court held that mere receipt of the signed copy of the award by the insurer’s advocate via email and forwarding it with his opinion to the client could not be treated as compliance with Section 31(5). The Court refused to expand or reinterpret the clear wording of the statute.
The High Court observed that it could not substitute its own view in place of the legislature’s choice in Section 31(5). Since the Act requires delivery of a signed copy to “each party”, service only on the advocate is not enough.
The Court considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Private Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460, cited by respondent no.1, but found that the issues in that case were not relevant to the present controversy.
Finally, applying the correct legal test, the High Court held that the reckoning date for limitation in this case would be the date on which the insurer actually received the signed award through registered post, namely 01.06.2022. Counting three months from that date, the Section 34 petition filed on 30.08.2022 was within time.
As a result, the Court set aside the District Judge’s order dated 22.03.2024 which had dismissed Misc. (Arbitration) Case No.115 of 2022 as time-barred. The Patna High Court allowed the commercial appeal and directed the learned District Judge, Patna to now hear the Section 34 case on its own merits.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for parties involved in arbitration, especially businesses and institutions that often act through lawyers and agents.
It makes clear that for the purpose of challenging an arbitral award under Section 34, limitation starts only when the party itself receives the signed copy of the award. Emails or copies received by the lawyer alone do not start the clock.
This offers significant protection to parties who might otherwise lose their right to challenge an award just because their lawyer received a copy early by email, without formal delivery to them.
At the same time, the judgment reminds arbitral tribunals to strictly comply with Section 31(5) and ensure that a signed copy is delivered to each party directly, usually by registered post or other reliable means.
For litigants in Bihar and beyond, this Patna High Court decision confirms that the Supreme Court’s view in Benarsi Krishna Committee and Tecco Trichy still governs. High Court decisions that treat service on the advocate or email alone as complete delivery cannot override these binding rulings.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Does sending a signed arbitral award by email to a party’s advocate amount to delivery of the award to the “party” under Section 31(5), so as to start limitation under Section 34(3)?
Answer: No. Following the Supreme Court in Benarsi Krishna Committee and Tecco Trichy, the Patna High Court held that “party” means the party itself, not its advocate. Limitation starts when the party receives the signed award, here via registered post on 01.06.2022. - Issue: Was the insurer’s Section 34 petition barred by limitation and rightly dismissed by the District Judge, Patna?
Answer: No. Since the petition filed on 30.08.2022 was within three months from 01.06.2022, it was within limitation. The dismissal order dated 22.03.2024 was set aside, and the case was directed to be heard on merits.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Union of India Vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239
- Benarsi Krishna Committee & Others Vs. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 9 SCC 496
- State of Maharashtra Vs. ARK Builders (P) Ltd., (2011) 4 SCC 616 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 413 (referred within Supreme Court extract)
- Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti Vs. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti, AIR 1962 SC 666 : (1962) 2 SCR 551 (distinguished in Supreme Court extract)
- Government of Maharashtra Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Private Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460 (held not relevant to the issue)
- Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Department of Ports, Government of India Vs. Ernst and Young Pvt. Ltd. (now Ernst and Young LLP) and Another, 2023:DHC:6055 (Delhi High Court; not followed in view of Supreme Court law)
- Continental Telepower Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1859 (Delhi High Court; referred in argument)
Case Details
Case Number: Commercial Appeal No.5 of 2024
Case Title: The New India Assurance Company Limited v. Apollo Trauma Centre & Anr.
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Praveen Kumar
Citation: 2026(2) PLJR 326
Date of Judgment: 04.02.2026
Advocates:
For the Appellant: Mr. Durgesh Kumar Singh, Advocate; Ms. Anjana Sinha, Advocate; Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, Advocate
For Respondent No.1: Mr. Bipin Bihari, Advocate
For Respondent No.2: Not served; treated as not a necessary party
Nature of the Case: Commercial appeal against order in Miscellaneous (Arbitration) Case No.115 of 2022 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, concerning limitation for setting aside an arbitral award
Impugned Order: Order dated 22.03.2024 of the learned District Judge, Patna dismissing the Section 34 petition as barred by limitation
Outcome in Appeal: Appeal allowed; impugned order set aside; Misc. (Arbitration) Case No.115 of 2022 held to be within limitation; District Judge, Patna directed to hear the case on merits
Link to Judgment: Click here to read the full Patna High Court judgment
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