Case Background
The case arose from an incident dated 24.04.1988 at about 7:00–7:30 a.m., in Daudnagar, District Aurangabad. According to the prosecution, a young boy, Ranjit Kumar, went outside his house to ease himself. Near Devi Asthan, close to his house, an unknown person allegedly caught his hands and started taking him towards a canal.
The boy raised an alarm. The informant’s cousin’s daughter, Sharda Kumari, aged about six years, was playing nearby. She allegedly saw the incident and rushed to inform the boy’s mother (the informant). The informant ran to the spot, caught hold of her son and questioned the unknown person. The man is said to have threatened her and told her to keep quiet or he would slap her. On her alarm, people from the neighbourhood gathered and apprehended the man.
On being questioned, the boy reportedly said that the man had lured him towards the canal on the promise of giving him sweets. The apprehended person disclosed his name as Lakhan Tiwari of Aurangabad. In her fardbeyan, the informant expressed an apprehension that the child might have been kidnapped for ransom and could be killed if ransom was not paid.
Based on this fardbeyan, Daudnagar P.S. Case No. 74/88 was registered. After investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against the accused under Sections 363 and 364 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Magistrate took cognizance, supplied copies under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) and committed the case to the Sessions Court under Section 209 Cr.PC.
The Sessions Court (Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Aurangabad) framed charges on 15.06.1993 under Sections 363 and 364 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. By judgment dated 21.09.2004 and order of sentence dated 28.09.2004 in S.T. No. 88 of 1990/16 of 2004, the trial court convicted him and sentenced him to: simple imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 363 IPC (and one year further imprisonment in default); and rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 364 IPC (and one year further simple imprisonment in default). Sentences were to run concurrently.
Aggrieved, the accused filed Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 812 of 2004 before the Patna High Court under Section 374(2) read with Section 389(1) Cr.PC, challenging both conviction and sentence. At the time of final hearing on 29.11.2025, his counsel was absent. The Court, therefore, appointed Ms. Kumari Anjali as Amicus Curiae to assist in deciding the appeal.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Patna High Court, per Hon’ble Mr. Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha, carefully went through the lower court records and the arguments of both sides. The Court focused on whether the prosecution had proved the offences of kidnapping under Sections 363 and 364 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution had examined six witnesses: P.W.-1 Lalti Devi (informant and mother of the victim), P.W.-2 Girja Das (father of the victim), P.W.-3 Ranjit Kumar (the victim), P.W.-4 Lakshman Sharma, P.W.-5 Sohrai Prasad, and P.W.-6 Kapildeo Prasad Singh (an advocate’s clerk). Only one document, the fardbeyan, was exhibited as Exhibit-1.
The Amicus Curiae argued that the conviction rested on suspicion rather than solid proof. She pointed out that the victim, Ranjit Kumar (P.W.-3), could not identify the accused in court during trial. Further, the Investigating Officer (I.O.) was not examined. Crucially, Sharda Kumari, the child alleged to have seen the incident and who first informed the informant, was never examined as a witness, as she had died during the pendency of the trial. The motive for kidnapping, whether for ransom or murder, was also not established.
It was also argued that the FIR (fardbeyan) was “proved” only through P.W.-6, an advocate’s clerk, who had no occasion to work with the I.O. and thus could not properly identify the handwriting or endorsement on the fardbeyan. The Amicus Curiae further submitted that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.PC was recorded in a very cryptic and mechanical manner, without properly putting all incriminating circumstances to him, which itself vitiated the conviction.
The State counsel opposed the appeal, stating that the victim had supported the occurrence. However, she fairly conceded that the victim failed to identify the accused in court and was declared hostile. She also admitted that Sharda Kumari, who was allegedly present at the time of occurrence, could not be examined.
The High Court first referred to the statutory provisions: Sections 359 and 360 IPC defining kidnapping and kidnapping from India, Section 363 IPC prescribing punishment for kidnapping, and Section 364 IPC dealing with kidnapping or abducting in order to murder. These provisions were set out for clarity on what had to be proved by the prosecution.
Then the Court closely analysed the evidence of each witness. It found that P.W.-4 and P.W.-5 were declared hostile and their testimonies yielded nothing useful either to support or to contradict the main prosecution story. Therefore, they did not help in establishing the guilt of the accused.
On the documentary side, the Court highlighted a serious defect: the fardbeyan had not been duly proved. It was sought to be proved through P.W.-6, an advocate’s clerk, who admitted he had no occasion to work with the I.O. and therefore could not properly identify the handwriting or endorsement on the fardbeyan. In such circumstances, the document could not be treated as proved. The non-examination of the I.O., who could have proved the document and explained the investigation, was held to be fatal to the prosecution.
To support this view, the Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 3 SCC 791. In that case, the Supreme Court held that non-examination of crucial witnesses such as the doctor and the I.O. can seriously prejudice the defence, and courts cannot lightly assume that their absence causes no prejudice. The Patna High Court extracted paragraphs 18 and 19 of that decision, emphasising that the failure to examine essential witnesses undermines the prosecution’s chain of events and makes a conviction unsustainable.
The Court then turned to the most important witness: Ranjit Kumar (P.W.-3), the victim and son of the informant. He did state that someone took him towards the canal on the pretext of giving sweets. But critically, he failed to identify the accused in court as that person. Because of this, he was declared hostile. Nothing emerged in his cross-examination to show that he could or did identify the accused.
The Court held that this non-identification by the victim was itself fatal to the prosecution. Without the victim saying that the man standing in the dock was the same person who had allegedly taken him, the prosecution could not link the accused to the alleged act.
It also emerged from the victim’s testimony that he was accompanied during the incident by his niece, Sharda Kumari, who had first informed P.W.-1. But she had died during the trial and was never examined. The Court saw her as an eye-witness whose testimony could have been crucial. Her non-examination, particularly when she was the one who alerted the informant, was also held to be fatal to the prosecution case.
As for P.W.-1 (the mother) and P.W.-2 (the father), the Court noted that their information was based entirely on what Sharda Kumari had told them. In other words, their evidence was hearsay about the very occurrence. Hearsay evidence, without the primary witness being examined, could not sustain a conviction for such serious charges.
Another key flaw identified was in the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.PC. The High Court observed from the record that this examination had been done in a “very cryptic and mechanical manner.” It was not in line with the law that each material circumstance must be put separately and simply to the accused, so that he can explain it.
To underline this point, the Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Sukhjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 10 SCC 270, and the earlier four-judge Bench decision in Tara Singh v. State, explaining that Section 313 (earlier Section 342) is not an empty formality. The Supreme Court has stressed that every material circumstance must be clearly put to the accused, particularly because an accused, often under stress and sometimes illiterate, may not understand complex questions. Non-compliance can cause serious prejudice and can vitiate the trial when the lapse is grave.
Considering all these factors together—non-identification by the victim, non-examination of the I.O., failure to examine the eye-witness child Sharda Kumari, improper proof of the fardbeyan, and a defective Section 313 examination—the Patna High Court concluded that the prosecution had “miserably failed” to prove the charges under Sections 363 and 364 IPC.
In the absence of reliable, legally admissible evidence connecting the accused to the alleged crime, the Court held that the conviction recorded by the trial court was not sustainable in law. Suspicion, however strong, could not take the place of proof.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The judgment of conviction dated 21.09.2004 and the order of sentence dated 28.09.2004 in S.T. No. 88 of 1990/16 of 2004, arising out of Daudnagar P.S. Case No. 74/88, were set aside. The accused was acquitted of all charges. As he was already on bail, he was discharged from further liability on his bail bond. Any fine deposited by him was directed to be refunded.
The Court also directed the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee to pay Rs. 5,000/- as consolidated fee to the Amicus Curiae, Ms. Kumari Anjali, for her professional assistance in the appeal. Lastly, the office was ordered to send back the lower court records along with a copy of the judgment to the trial court.
Why This Judgment Matters
This decision is important for criminal trials, especially in serious offences like kidnapping. It shows that even when there is a strong suspicion, a person cannot be kept convicted unless the prosecution strictly proves its case with reliable evidence.
For ordinary people, the judgment underlines that courts will not rely on hearsay or assumptions. The victim must be able to identify the accused, and key witnesses like the Investigating Officer and eye-witnesses must be examined. If this is not done, the accused cannot be punished merely on the basis of fear or possibility of a crime.
The judgment also reminds trial courts to properly question the accused under Section 313 Cr.PC. An accused must be clearly told what evidence is being used against him and must be given a real chance to explain. A casual, mechanical questioning process can make the entire conviction doubtful.
Ultimately, the ruling reinforces that fair procedure, complete evidence, and proper identification are essential safeguards in criminal justice. It offers guidance for future kidnapping cases and for defence lawyers dealing with similar gaps in prosecution evidence.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused kidnapped the child with an intention falling under Sections 363 and 364 IPC?
Answer: No. The Patna High Court held that non-identification by the victim, non-examination of the Investigating Officer and eye-witness, and improper proof of the fardbeyan meant the prosecution failed to establish the charges. - Issue: Whether serious procedural lapses, including a cryptic Section 313 Cr.PC examination, affected the validity of the conviction?
Answer: Yes. The Court held that the Section 313 examination was conducted in a mechanical manner, contrary to Supreme Court guidelines, making the conviction questionable and contributing to its setting aside.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 3 SCC 791
- Sukhjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 10 SCC 270
- Tara Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 903 : AIR 1951 SC 441 : (1951) 52 Cri LJ 1491 (quoted within Sukhjit Singh)
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 812 of 2004
Case Title: Lakhan Tiwari v. State of Bihar
Citation: 2026 (1) PLJR 234
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha
Date of Judgment: 29.11.2025
Trial Court Details: Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5, Aurangabad in S.T. No. 88 of 1990/16 of 2004, arising out of Daudnagar P.S. Case No. 74/88
Sections Involved: Sections 363 and 364 of the Indian Penal Code; Sections 207, 209, 313, 374(2), 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Advocates: Ms. Kumari Anjali, Amicus Curiae for the appellant/accused; Ms. Anita Kumari Singh, APP for the State
Nature of Case: Criminal appeal against judgment of conviction and order of sentence in a kidnapping case
Link to Judgment: Click here to read the full judgment of the Patna High Court
If you found this explanation helpful and wish to stay informed about
how legal developments may affect your rights in Bihar,
you may consider following Samvida Law Associates for more updates.
