Case Background
The case started from Bihta P.S. Case No. 678 of 2015. The FIR was based on the fardbeyan of the prosecutrix, recorded at Patna Medical College and Hospital (PMCH) on 23.08.2015 at about 8:30 p.m. by a Sub-Inspector from Rupaspur Police Station.
The girl stated that, in the morning of 23.08.2015, she went with neighbour children to graze she-goats near a canal (nahar). She claimed that when her goats crossed to the other side, she followed them. There, according to her, three men raped her while a fourth kept watch. Some of these men were known to her as co-villagers; one was described as a man from another village whose name she did not know but could identify.
On this basis, Bihta police registered the case under Sections 376A/376D IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act against three named accused and one unknown person. After investigation, police submitted charge‑sheet No. 360 of 2015 on 20.10.2015. Cognizance was taken on 19.11.2015.
On 16.02.2016, charges were framed under Section 376/34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. During trial in Special Case No. 127 of 2015, the prosecution examined seven witnesses, including the prosecutrix, her neighbour, her aunt, her mother, the doctor from Danapur Sub‑Divisional Hospital, and two investigating officers.
The trial court relied mainly on the prosecutrix’s testimony, some medical notes, and a school admit card produced as proof of age. It convicted all three appellants under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act, treating the case as gang penetrative sexual assault. Each was sentenced on 30.08.2018 to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000, and one year simple imprisonment in default.
Three separate criminal appeals (DB) – No. 1268 of 2018, No. 1327 of 2018 and No. 120 of 2021 – were filed before the Patna High Court to challenge this conviction and sentence.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Division Bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Shailendra Singh carefully re‑examined the entire trial record. They approached the case in stages: age of the prosecutrix, place of occurrence, conduct of police and medical evidence, credibility of the prosecutrix, and the use of presumptions under the POCSO Act.
Doubt about age and applicability of POCSO
The trial court had treated the girl as a “child” under the POCSO Act mainly on the strength of an admit card (Exhibit 8) from Bihar School Examination Board, showing date of birth as 15.12.1999.
The High Court noted that:
- In her fardbeyan and in her Section 164 CrPC statement (Exhibit 2), the prosecutrix herself stated her age as 18 years.
- In both these earlier statements she gave her name as a particular name (anonymised here), not the different name printed as candidate’s name on the admit card. She signed Exhibit 2 with the older name.
- When she deposed as PW‑1 in 2017, more than one and a half years later, her recorded name was changed to another name plus the earlier alias, and she claimed her date of birth was 15.12.1999, saying she had earlier given it wrongly.
- In cross‑examination she said she studied in “Savitri Kanya Uchh Vidyalaya”, whereas Exhibit 8 mentioned “Pavitri Kanya H/S, Simri, Danapur”. She never clearly stated that she was a student of the school named on Exhibit 8.
- Her aunt (PW‑3) and mother (PW‑4) consistently referred to her by the earlier name, and did not depose that she studied in the school shown on the admit card.
- The admit card on the record was only a photocopy; the original was not retained or proved. No school principal or official was examined. The investigating officer never verified the school records.
Given these factors, the Court held that Exhibit 8 could not safely be taken as proof that the prosecutrix was the same person as the candidate named on the admit card, or that she was below 18 on the date of occurrence.
The Court further noted that the doctor’s X‑ray‑based assessment (through PMCH report referred to by PW‑5) had placed her age between 17–19 years, and that under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the trial court was obliged to follow the statutory method in Section 94 for age determination. This was not done.
As a result, the Bench held that the key “foundational fact” for applying the POCSO Act – that the victim was a minor – was not proved.
Unclear place of occurrence and improbable story of grazing
The alleged assault was said to have occurred across a canal in a paddy field. The Court found serious inconsistencies in how different witnesses described this place:
- In the fardbeyan and Section 164 statement, the girl said she went across the canal towards a forest, and her pyjama was thrown into a paddy field.
- In court, she described going across the canal into a paddy field to graze goats, and stated that no villagers were nearby at the time.
- PW‑2, the child neighbour, said there were paddy crops on both sides, and a large number of farmers had gone to see their crops.
- The first investigating officer (PW‑6) gave yet another description: an 8‑metre patch with long grass bushes, a canal “chat” to the north, some “parti” land and some paddy fields. She admitted she did not prepare any site map and initially could not say who showed her the place.
- Later she said she “came to know” of the place from three villagers, but none of them were examined in court. At the same time, the prosecutrix claimed in cross‑examination that she herself had shown the place of occurrence to the police, which could not be true because she was admitted in PMCH during that period.
The Bench also found the grazing story itself doubtful. All children were grazing goats on one side of the canal during rainy, paddy‑cultivation season, yet only the prosecutrix’s goats allegedly crossed the canal. It was argued, and accepted as plausible by the Court, that goats generally avoid entering water, making this account less believable.
In the Court’s view, the prosecution had not proved the precise place of occurrence “beyond all reasonable doubts”.
Suppressed first version at Maner Police Station
Both the prosecutrix (PW‑1) and her aunt (PW‑3) consistently said they first went to Maner Police Station after the incident, along with the girl’s sister and brother‑in‑law.
PW‑3 stated that at Maner Police Station “writings and study” took place, that the girl “lodged the case”, and only then became unconscious, after which she was taken to Danapur Sadar Hospital and later referred to PMCH.
However:
- No FIR from Maner Police Station was produced.
- No officer from Maner Police Station was examined.
- The fardbeyan which formed the basis of the FIR was instead recorded later at PMCH by a Rupaspur officer (PW‑6), not by Maner or Bihta police.
- The girl did not originally mention becoming unconscious in her fardbeyan; this was introduced later in her Section 164 statement and deposition with differing timelines.
The Court found that the first version given at Maner had been suppressed. It observed that, even if the girl had fainted, Maner police could and should have recorded a report based on the aunt or other accompanying relatives, but there was no explanation why this was not done.
Problems with medical evidence
The prosecution produced only a “supplementary injury report” (Exhibit 4) prepared on 13.09.2015 on plain paper by the Danapur doctor (PW‑5), about 18 days after the incident and after discharge from PMCH.
From this and PW‑5’s testimony, the Court noted:
- The original emergency treatment papers from Danapur on 23.08.2015 were not produced.
- No doctor from PMCH was examined, although the girl was admitted there from 23.08.2015 to 28.08.2015.
- The discharge ticket of PMCH, which reportedly recorded that the patient was conscious and there was “no tear and no bleeding”, was merely “seen” by the trial court and never exhibited. The High Court drew an adverse inference, treating this as suppression of an important document.
- PW‑5 did not record any complaint of sexual assault in Exhibit 4, found no injury on the private parts, and explicitly wrote that, “according to above report it is difficult to say that rape has occurred or not”.
- She accepted that injuries on the body could have been caused by a fall on a peg (“khuta”).
Considering this, the Court held that medical evidence did not support the prosecution’s claim of a violent gangrape.
Delays and gaps in seizure and forensic testing of clothes
The prosecutrix claimed she was raped in a field, her pyjama was thrown into a paddy crop, and she then ran naked across the canal, picked it up and wore it. She also said she remained in the same clothes until police seizure.
The High Court noted several problems:
- The aunt (PW‑3) said clothes were seized by police that night; PW‑6 said seizure happened only on 25.08.2015 because the girl had no spare clothes until her mother brought some from Delhi.
- The seizure list (Exhibits 5 to 5/1) showed the seizing officer as PW‑6, not the male officer (Deepak Kumar) whom she tried to credit in testimony. Deepak Kumar was never examined.
- The seizure list reached court only on 07.09.2015, about 13 days after the alleged seizure, with no clear court order or explanation as to where the clothes were kept in the meantime.
- Only on 06.10.2015 did the second IO move to send the cuttings of these clothes and of the accused’s clothes to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL).
- The FSL report (Exhibit 7) found human blood and semen on the girl’s salwar/ganjee cuttings (Exhibit A), but no blood or semen on the accused’s clothes (Exhibits B and C). The blood group on Exhibit A was “B”, but there was no evidence of the blood group of the girl or the accused. No DNA or matching test was done.
- The girl was menstruating (last menstrual period recorded as 20.08.2015), so presence of blood alone could not prove rape.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Krishan Kumar Malik, the High Court held that failure to medically examine the accused and to match semen or blood made the forensic evidence weak and inconclusive.
Credibility of the prosecutrix and use of POCSO presumptions
The Bench emphasised that conviction can rest on the sole testimony of a victim of sexual assault, but only when that testimony is of “sterling quality” – consistent, natural, and able to withstand cross‑examination, as explained in Rai Sandeep and later cases.
Here, the Court catalogued multiple inconsistencies in the prosecutrix’s narration about:
- Her age and name,
- Whether she was going to school and which school,
- The exact place of occurrence and surroundings,
- Whether villagers were present nearby,
- Whether a villager named Chandeshwar Mahto appeared and caused the assailants to flee,
- Whether the accused remained at the spot after the act,
- Her timeline of becoming unconscious and regaining consciousness.
In light of these and the gaps in corroborating evidence, the Court held that she could not be treated as a sterling witness whose testimony alone could safely sustain conviction.
On Section 29 of the POCSO Act (presumption of guilt), the Court referred to several High Court decisions and to the Supreme Court ruling in Babu v. State of Kerala on presumption of innocence. It held that the prosecution must first establish foundational facts before the presumption can operate. Since even the basic facts about age, place of occurrence and assault were not reliably proved, it would be a “travesty of justice” to uphold conviction merely by invoking the presumption.
Final decision
After a detailed review, the Patna High Court concluded that:
- The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was a minor, that the alleged gangrape took place in the manner claimed, or that the appellants were the perpetrators.
- Serious prejudice was caused to the defence by non‑examination of key police officers and doctors and by suppression of important documents like the PMCH discharge ticket and original treatment notes.
- The trial court misapplied the POCSO presumption and did not use its powers under Section 165 Evidence Act to clarify crucial doubts.
Accordingly, the Court allowed all three appeals, set aside the judgment of conviction dated 24.08.2018 and order of sentence dated 30.08.2018, and acquitted all appellants by giving them the benefit of doubt. It directed that they be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for several reasons. First, it shows that even in sensitive offences like rape and POCSO cases, courts will not compromise on the basic rule that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Sympathy or outrage cannot replace proof.
Second, it reminds police and prosecutors that they must preserve and present all material records – first versions, medical notes, original hospital papers, school records and proper forensic evidence. Suppressing or mishandling such documents can completely break the case.
Third, it clarifies that the special presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is not automatic. The prosecution must first establish foundational facts such as age of the victim and basic reliability of the incident. Only then does the burden shift to the accused.
Finally, for families and victims, the judgment underlines the need to give consistent statements and cooperate fully in providing accurate documents like age proof. Any confusion in names, dates or places can weaken a genuine case.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Was the prosecutrix proved to be a “child” so that the POCSO Act and its presumptions could apply?
Answer: No. The Court held that the admit card (Exhibit 8) did not reliably relate to the prosecutrix, the statutory method of age determination was not followed, and medical evidence placed her age between 17–19 years. Hence her minority was not proved. - Issue: Did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants committed gangrape/penetrative sexual assault?
Answer: No. Due to inconsistent testimony, unclear place of occurrence, suppressed first report, weak and incomplete medical and forensic evidence, and non‑examination of key witnesses, the Court found that guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. - Issue: Could the trial court rely on Section 29 of the POCSO Act to presume guilt despite these gaps?
Answer: No. The High Court held that without foundational facts, presumption under Section 29 cannot be invoked. Using it in this case would be a travesty of justice.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 – concept of “sterling witness”.
- Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 – importance of proper medical and forensic evidence in rape cases.
- Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 260 (2024 INSC 193) – scrutiny of sole testimony of victim.
- Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 – presumption of innocence and statutory presumptions.
- Navin Dhaniram Baraiye v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1281 – foundational facts for Section 29 POCSO.
- Joy V. S. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 783 – similar view on POCSO presumption.
- Sahid Hossain Biswas v. State of West Bengal, 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 5023 – scope of Section 29 POCSO.
- Latu Das v. State of Assam, 2019 SCC OnLine Gau 5947 – prosecution’s burden despite POCSO presumption.
- P. Yuvaprakash v. State rep. by Inspector of Police, AIR 2023 SC 3525 – relied on by defence regarding age determination.
- Pradeep v. State of Haryana, AIR 2023 SC 3245 – child witness examination, cited in arguments.
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1268 of 2018; Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1327 of 2018; Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 120 of 2021, all arising out of Bihta P.S. Case No. 678 of 2015 / Special Case No. 127 of 2015.
Case Title: Vinay Kumar v. State of Bihar; Sarju Chaudhary @ Saryug Chaudhary @ Suraj Chaudhary v. State of Bihar; Kamlesh @ Jalebi v. State of Bihar.
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Shailendra Singh.
Citation: 2024 (4) PLJR 533.
Advocates:
- For appellant Vinay Kumar (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1268 of 2018): Mr. Ramakant Sharma, Senior Advocate; Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate.
- For appellant Sarju Chaudhary (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1327 of 2018): Mr. Vijay Kumar Sinha, Advocate; Mr. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, Advocate; Mr. Satendra Kumar Bhatnagar, Advocate; Mr. Kumar Shivam Sinha, Advocate; Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocate; Mr. Krishn Murari Prasad, Advocate.
- For appellant Kamlesh @ Jalebi (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 120 of 2021): Mr. Pratik Mishra, Amicus Curiae.
- For the State in different appeals: Ms. Shashi Bala Verma, Addl. P.P.; Mr. Abhimanyu Sharma, Addl. P.P.; Mr. Ajay Mishra, Addl. P.P.
Nature of the Case: Criminal appeals (Division Bench) against judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge‑I‑cum‑Special Judge, POCSO, Patna, in a case alleging gangrape and penetrative sexual assault under IPC and POCSO.
Date of High Court Judgment: 07.10.2024 (C.A.V.; CAV date: 09.08.2024).
Outcome: Appeals allowed; conviction and life sentence set aside; appellants acquitted by benefit of doubt and ordered to be released if not wanted in any other case.
Link to Judgment: Full text of Patna High Court judgment
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