Case Background
The proceedings arose from ECIR No. PTZO/04/2024 dated 14 March 2024, registered as “Directorate of Enforcement, Patna v. Sanjeev Hans and others”. That ECIR was based on an FIR No. 18 of 2023 dated 9 January 2023 at Rupaspur Police Station, Patna, against a serving IAS officer, an ex-MLA and others.
During this money laundering investigation under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), the ED conducted a search at the petitioner’s residence at CF-374, Salt Lake City, Sector-1, Kolkata on 25 January 2025. According to ED, materials collected during search gave them reason to believe that the petitioner was prima facie guilty of an offence under PMLA. He was arrested at about 3:30 p.m. that day.
The ED then transported the petitioner by air to Patna and produced him the same evening at about 9:00 p.m. before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Patna. On ED’s remand application, the CJM remanded the petitioner to ED custody on 25 January 2025.
The petitioner moved the Patna High Court in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 196 of 2025. He attacked the legality of his arrest, the manner of his production before the CJM, Patna, and the remand order itself. By supplementary affidavit he also challenged the remand on the ground that the CJM failed to examine compliance with Section 19 PMLA before sending him to ED custody.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The core complaint was that ED violated Article 22(2) of the Constitution and Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) by not producing the petitioner before the “nearest Magistrate” in Kolkata immediately after arrest, and by flying him directly to Patna for production before the CJM there.
The petitioner also alleged breach of Section 58 BNSS and argued that the CJM’s remand order was invalid because it did not record or consider the mandatory “reason to believe” safeguards in Section 19 PMLA. On that basis, he sought a declaration that his detention was illegal, quashing of the remand order, and his release from custody in the ECIR pending before the Special Judge (PMLA), Patna.
On the constitutional issue, the petitioner’s senior counsel built his argument around Article 22(2), which says that every arrested person “shall be produced before the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours” and cannot be detained longer without the authority of a Magistrate. He stressed that:
• “Nearest Magistrate” must be given its literal meaning: the Magistrate geographically nearest to the place of arrest, regardless of whether that Magistrate has territorial jurisdiction over the case.
• The object is to ensure an immediate, independent judicial check on the arrest, and to give the arrested person prompt opportunity to challenge the arrest and seek bail.
• Section 187 BNSS, which allows a “nearest Judicial Magistrate” to authorize detention even without jurisdiction to try the case, reflects the same scheme.
He relied on various Supreme Court decisions on statutory interpretation, due process, and remand, including Madhu Limaye, Tulsiram Patel, Subramanian Swamy, Pankaj Bansal, Gautam Navlakha and others, to argue that courts cannot read “nearest Magistrate” as “jurisdictional Magistrate” or dilute the constitutional safeguard.
He further alleged that ED had pre-decided to arrest the petitioner even before search, pointing to the purchase of an air ticket at 8:35 a.m. on 25 January 2025, though the search and arrest took place later that day. In his view, this showed an arrest without genuine “reason to believe” under Section 19 PMLA.
On the second limb, he contended that the CJM’s remand order was defective because it did not explicitly record that the Magistrate had satisfied himself about ED’s “reason to believe” and compliance with Section 19. He sought to characterise the detention as illegal and beyond the validating power of a later remand.
On behalf of ED, the Special Counsel presented a different reading of Article 22(2) and the statutory scheme. He relied on the Constituent Assembly debates, particularly Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s explanation for using the term “nearest Magistrate” in draft Article 15A (now Article 22). Dr. Ambedkar had said that “nearest Magistrate” was used to prevent the police from keeping a person in custody longer on the plea that the trial Magistrate was far away, and to ensure that the accused got his case “judicially considered” at the earliest.
ED’s counsel argued that this does not mean that if the arresting agency can produce the accused before the jurisdictional Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time), it is barred from doing so. The constitutional safeguard is the 24-hour limit and judicial scrutiny, not insistence on a local transit remand in every case.
He drew strong support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Gautam Navlakha, where the Court explained Section 167 CrPC (now reflected in Section 187 BNSS) and held that an arrested person must be produced within 24 hours before “the Magistrate who is nearest from the place of arrest irrespective of whether he is having jurisdiction or not.” The Court there clarified that a nearest Magistrate may or may not have jurisdiction, but the scheme does not make production before a transit Magistrate compulsory when direct production before the jurisdictional Magistrate within 24 hours is possible.
The Patna High Court carefully analysed this. It held that:
• “Nearest Magistrate” comes into play where, because of distance and travel time, the arrested person cannot be produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate within 24 hours after excluding journey time.
• In such a situation, the arresting agency must produce the accused before the nearest Judicial Magistrate, along with case diary entries, so that this Magistrate can consider remand or further steps.
• However, where the arresting officer can produce the accused before the jurisdictional Magistrate within 24 hours, there is no requirement in Article 22(2) or Section 187 BNSS that compels production first before a local “transit” Magistrate.
The Court relied not only on Gautam Navlakha but also on a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Sat Parkash Yadav, where an accused arrested in Noida was brought directly to Delhi within about an hour. There, the Court held that obtaining a transit remand from the local Magistrate was not “essential” where direct production within 24 hours was feasible. The Patna High Court found the present case “absolutely similar” on facts, as ED could (and did) bring the petitioner from Kolkata to Patna by air and produce him before the CJM, Patna, the same evening.
On that basis, the Court held that there was no violation of Article 22(2) or Section 58/187 BNSS. The petitioner was produced within 24 hours before a Magistrate competent in PMLA matters, so his fundamental right under Article 22(2) was not breached.
On the challenge to the remand order and Section 19 PMLA compliance, the Court noted that:
• ED had, prior to arrest, already formed “reason to believe” for search under Section 17 PMLA, which itself requires recorded reasons regarding money-laundering, possession of proceeds of crime, relevant records, or property related to crime.
• After search, ED recorded reasons for belief under Section 19(1), prepared and served the grounds of arrest to the petitioner, and placed those materials along with a detailed remand application before the CJM, Patna.
• The petitioner did not dispute that the arresting officer had recorded reasons and furnished the grounds of arrest.
In that context, the Court held that the CJM’s omission to use the “magic words” of Section 19(1) in the remand order could at best be an inadvertent omission and did not by itself vitiate the arrest or detention, especially when the underlying materials were before the Magistrate. The task of a higher court, when such issues are raised, is to itself examine whether ED had prima facie “reason to believe” on the materials, rather than to set aside the detention merely because the remand order is not perfectly worded.
Importantly, the Court also examined the maintainability of the writ petition itself. It held that:
• A remand order is a judicial order. The proper remedy against it lies under the criminal procedure framework (for example, approaching the Special Court or seeking bail or revision), not ordinarily via a writ under Article 226.
• The Supreme Court in Neelam Manmohan Attavar and more recently in Radhika Agarwal has cautioned that when an efficacious alternative judicial remedy exists (appeal, revision, bail, special leave under Article 136), writ jurisdiction is not the correct route to attack such an order.
• Judicial review in the context of special laws like PMLA is narrow: the court may examine whether the arresting officer was authorised, whether “reason to believe” is based on some material, and whether grounds of arrest were communicated; it should not conduct a “mini-trial” or re-assess sufficiency of evidence at this early stage.
Since in this case there was no demonstrated violation of the core constitutional or statutory safeguards, and the petitioner had alternative remedies, the High Court declined to interfere. It held that the writ petition was devoid of merit and dismissed it, without costs.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment has practical consequences for people arrested by national agencies like ED, especially when arrest takes place in one State and the case is registered in another.
First, it clarifies that what Article 22(2) of the Constitution protects is production before a Magistrate within 24 hours, not necessarily before a local Magistrate at the place of arrest, if the jurisdictional Magistrate can be reached in time. Demanding mandatory local transit remand in every case, even when quick air travel is possible, is not required.
Second, the decision confirms that remand orders under PMLA cannot usually be attacked head-on through writ petitions. Accused persons must normally move the Special Court or higher criminal courts for bail or revision.
Third, it reinforces that courts will look at whether ED has recorded “reasons to believe” and served grounds of arrest, but will not lightly treat omissions in the wording of a remand order as fatal when the underlying materials exist and are placed before the Magistrate.
For individuals who fear arbitrary arrest, the case explains that the key safeguards are: production before a Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time), recorded reasons for belief under Section 19 PMLA, and communication of grounds of arrest. For ED and other agencies, it underlines that while they must strictly comply with these safeguards, they are not forced into unnecessary transit remand proceedings where they can bring the accused directly before the jurisdictional court within time.
Legal Issues and Answers
-
Issue: Did ED violate Article 22(2) of the Constitution and Section 187/58 BNSS by not producing the petitioner before the “nearest Magistrate” in Kolkata after arrest and instead taking him directly to the CJM, Patna?
Answer: No. The Court held that “nearest Magistrate” comes into play only where the accused cannot be produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time). Since ED produced the petitioner before the CJM, Patna, within 24 hours, there was no violation. -
Issue: Was the remand order of the CJM, Patna, rendered illegal because it did not explicitly record satisfaction regarding ED’s “reason to believe” under Section 19 PMLA?
Answer: No. ED had recorded reasons, served grounds of arrest, and placed detailed material before the Magistrate. The omission of specific wording in the remand order was treated as at most inadvertent and not a defect going to the root of jurisdiction. -
Issue: Is a criminal writ under Article 226 an appropriate remedy to quash a remand order in such circumstances and to seek release from custody?
Answer: Generally no. The Court held that when alternative efficacious remedies like bail, revision or appeal exist under the criminal law framework, extraordinary writ jurisdiction should not be used to set aside remand orders, absent clear violation of fundamental safeguards.
Cases Cited by the Court
- The judgment refers to and relies upon several decisions, including:
- Madhu Limaye and others, (1969) 1 SCC 292
- Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398
- Subramanian Swamy v. Election Commission of India, (2008) 14 SCC 318
- D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner, (1977) 2 SCC 273
- Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India & Ors., (2024) 7 SCC 576
- Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, (2022) 13 SCC 542
- Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929
- Sat Parkash Yadav v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3012
- Neelam Manmohan Attavar v. Manmohan Attavar, (2021) 16 SCC 536
- Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. (Criminal) No. 336 of 2018, decided on 27.02.2025
- Other cited authorities were discussed but not all were central to the final ratio.
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 196 of 2025
Case Title: Uttam Daga @ Uttam Kumar Daga v. Union of India & Ors.
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri
Citation: 2025 (2) PLJR 594
Advocates:
- For the Petitioner: Mr. Jitendra Singh, Senior Advocate; Mr. Harsh Singh, Advocate
- For the Respondents (Union of India): Dr. Krishna Nandan Singh, ASG
- For the Enforcement Directorate: Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Special Counsel; Mr. Manoj Kumar Singh, Special PP; Mr. Prabhat Kumar Singh, Special PP; Mr. Pranjal Tripathi, Advocate; Mr. Ankit Kumar Singh, Advocate
Nature of the Case: Criminal writ petition challenging arrest and remand under PMLA; prayer for declaration of detention as illegal, quashing of remand order, and release from custody.
Date of Judgment: 08-04-2025
Link to Judgment: View Patna High Court Judgment
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