LPG distributorship cancellation for lack of land possession upheld — Patna High Court, 2021

Shipra Sinha

Reviewed by: Shipra Sinha

License Number: BR/1674/2021

Shipra Sinha is a lawyer at Samvida Law Associates practicing family law and civil disputes. She represents clients in matrimonial matters, inheritance disputes, property-related family conflicts, and civil litigation before the Patna High Court and subordinate courts. Her practice handles family law proceedings and civil matters for individuals and families across Bihar.

Indian Oil’s cancellation of a selected LPG distributorship was challenged. The Patna High Court held that the applicant did not meet the land possession requirement on the date of application. The writ petition was dismissed. The fresh draw of lots in favour of another candidate therefore remains undisturbed.

Case Background

An advertisement was published on 17.06.2017 in the Hindi daily “Dainik Jagran” inviting applications for LPG Gramin Distributorship at Chhitauni, Block Basopatti, District Madhubani.

The petitioner applied along with other candidates. A draw of lots was held on 10.01.2019, in which the petitioner was declared successful for the LPG distributorship.

After being selected, she deposited Rs. 20,000 as security for field verification and submitted documents. She offered two different pieces of land, one for the LPG godown and another for the showroom.

Both parcels of land had been leased to her for 15 years by two lease deeds dated 04.08.2017. According to the petitioner, these lease deeds stated that the lease would commence from the date on which Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) issued a Letter of Intent (LOI), and rent would be payable from that date.

Later, by way of “abundant precaution”, a rectification lease deed dated 14.05.2019 was executed between her and the lessor regarding both original lease deeds. The rectification stated that the 15-year lease period would commence from the date of execution of the lease deeds, i.e., 04.08.2017.

During field verification, IOCL examined the lease documents. By letter dated 26.06.2019, the Chief Area Manager, Indane Area Office, Begusarai, cancelled the petitioner’s candidature. IOCL recorded that she had not fulfilled the condition of “owning” suitable land for both godown and showroom as on the date of submission of the application.

After cancelling her candidature, IOCL conducted a fresh draw of lots on 19.11.2019, in which respondent no. 6 was declared successful.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition before the Patna High Court. She sought quashing of the cancellation letter dated 26.06.2019 and also a declaration that the fresh draw of lots in favour of respondent no. 6 was null and void.

What the Court Examined and Decided

The core dispute before the Patna High Court was whether, on the date of her application, the petitioner legally fulfilled the land requirement laid down in IOCL’s selection guidelines and brochure.

For the SP (w) category, the guideline required that the applicant or family member should own or have a registered long-term lease (minimum 15 years) over suitable land for LPG godown and/or showroom. The land had to be available with the applicant as on the date of application, within the period fixed in the brochure.

The impugned cancellation letter stated that the petitioner did not meet this requirement on the date of application.

Petitioner’s arguments

The petitioner’s counsel argued that the lease deeds dated 04.08.2017 could not be treated as “futuristic”. Once a lease deed is executed and registered, it becomes operative from the date of execution unless the law provides otherwise.

He submitted that although the lease deeds contained a clause that the lease term would start from the date of issuance of LOI, the rectification deed dated 14.05.2019 clarified that the 15-year period would run from 04.08.2017, the date of execution itself. According to him, this showed that the intention of parties was always that the lease should be effective from that earlier date.

He relied heavily on a prior judgment of a co-ordinate Bench in Shankar Kumar Bhagat vs. The Indian Oil Corporation & Ors., reported in 2019 (4) PLJR 663. In that case, the Court held that a lease deed which clearly stated that land was leased “from today” and possession had been delivered on the date of execution, was valid from that date even though it also mentioned that the lease period would run for 29 years from the date of licence. The Court in that case treated a subsequent rectification deed as merely correcting an inadvertent error, and set aside IOCL’s cancellation of candidature.

The petitioner also relied on another decision of the Patna High Court in Priya Kumari vs. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors. (CWJC No. 7292 of 2020, decided on 14.09.2020). There the Court accepted a rectification deed correcting a wrong plot number in a lease, holding that such an error did not fall in the “non-rectifiable” category and IOCL should not take a hyper-technical view.

On the strength of these decisions, the petitioner contended that IOCL should have treated her rectified lease deeds as valid proof of land ownership/lease on the relevant date and that cancellation of her candidature was arbitrary.

IOCL’s response

The Senior Counsel for IOCL argued that during field verification, it became clear that the original lease deeds dated 04.08.2017 did not mention anywhere that the lease was for 15 years from a date between the advertisement and the date of application.

Instead, the deeds only expressed the lessor’s willingness to give land on rent if the petitioner was appointed as an LPG distributor. The key clause stated that the lease would be for 15 years “from the date” she was selected as a distributor of the gas agency. There was no recital of possession being handed over on 04.08.2017, nor any clear statement that the lease became effective from that date.

It was only after this defect was pointed out that the petitioner produced the rectification deed dated 14.05.2019. IOCL argued that this document came long after the date of application and could not cure the basic deficiency that land was not available with the petitioner on the crucial date.

IOCL relied on its brochure, particularly the clause that land must be available with the applicant as on the date of application and that ownership/lease documents must be valid as on dates specified. IOCL stressed that this was a basic eligibility condition.

They also cited Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1892, to argue that the lease deeds, in their original form, only showed the lessor’s agreement to lease in future, depending on IOCL’s appointment of the petitioner. Without possession being transferred and without the lease starting, the petitioner had not acquired any present interest in the land by 04.08.2017.

IOCL further relied on an earlier decision of the Patna High Court in Neeraj Kumar vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2009 (3) PLJR 591. There, the Court held that a candidate’s right to be considered crystallises on the date of application and cannot be altered by subsequent documents. Allowing later documents would permit candidates to keep changing basic papers until the last stage, which is impermissible.

Court’s reading of the lease deeds

The Court carefully reproduced and examined the key clauses from the lease deeds dated 04.08.2017.

From those recitals, the Court concluded that, on the date of application, the petitioner was not in possession of the land. The deeds clearly showed that the lease would become operative for 15 years from the date she was appointed as LPG distributor by IOCL, not from the date of execution.

There was no statement that possession had been handed over on 04.08.2017, nor that the lease had come into force from that date. The document, in the Court’s view, expressed only the lessor’s willingness to give the land on rent if and when the petitioner was selected.

Thus, as per the brochure’s basic requirement that land must be available with the applicant on the date of application, the petitioner failed to qualify.

Effect of rectification deed dated 14.05.2019

The Court held that the rectification or corrected lease deed of 14.05.2019 related to a time “much after” the date of application.

Applying the principle laid down in Neeraj Kumar, the Court held that the petitioner could not change or improve her basic documents after filing the application. The rectification could not be used to show that she had land available on the earlier date when, in fact, she did not.

The Court also found that the case was squarely covered by another co-ordinate Bench decision in Avinash Aarohi vs. The Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors. (CWJC No. 11874 of 2019, decided on 30.07.2019). In that case, the lease deed only said that it would be valid for 29 years from the date of grant of licence, without stating that the lease had already become effective or that possession had been given. The Court there dismissed the writ, holding that such a deed did not show land availability on the date of application.

Following Avinash Aarohi, the Court in the present case held that a lease which becomes effective only on grant of licence or appointment cannot satisfy the requirement of land being available on the application date.

Distinguishing earlier favourable judgments

The Court then considered the petitioner’s reliance on Shankar Kumar Bhagat and Priya Kumari.

In Shankar Kumar Bhagat, the lease deed explicitly stated that land was provided on lease “from today” for 29 years at annual rent of Rs. 95,000 and that the lessee had taken possession. A later rectification simply corrected a line that said the lease period would run from the date of licence. Because the deed itself made the lease immediately effective and showed handover of possession, the Court in that case held that the candidate did have land on the application date.

The present case, the Court noted, was different. The lease deeds dated 04.08.2017 had no such language of immediate effectiveness or possession. They only said that the 15-year lease period would start from the date of IOCL appointing the petitioner as distributor. Therefore, the principle of Shankar Kumar Bhagat could not help her.

Similarly, in Priya Kumari, the issue was a typographical mistake in the plot number mentioned in the lease deed, while the application itself had correctly mentioned the plot number. The Court there held that such an error did not fall in the “non-rectifiable” category and accepted a rectification deed.

In contrast, in the present case the defect was substantive, not typographical: the very commencement of the lease and availability of land were pegged to a future event (appointment as distributor). This went to the root of eligibility, and could not be cured later.

Final outcome

After analysing the documents and case law, the Court concluded that the petitioner did not have the required land available with her on the date of application.

Because this was a basic eligibility condition under the IOCL brochure, her candidature was rightly cancelled by the letter dated 26.06.2019.

The rectification deed dated 14.05.2019, being subsequent to the application and changing the fundamental nature of the lease, could not be taken into account. Allowing it would violate the principle that documents cannot be altered after the application date.

Accordingly, the Court held that the writ petition had no merit and dismissed it. As a result, the fresh draw of lots held on 19.11.2019 in favour of respondent no. 6 remained undisturbed.

Why This Judgment Matters

This judgment is important for all candidates applying for LPG distributorships, petrol pumps, or similar government or public sector allotments based on land availability.

It makes clear that the land requirement is not a formality. The applicant must actually have a valid ownership or long-term lease and possession as on the date of application, not merely a promise or conditional arrangement depending on future selection.

The Patna High Court emphasised that documents like a lease deed cannot be drafted in a way that postpones the start of lease till after selection, and then later corrected to show an earlier date. Rectification deeds executed after the application date cannot change basic eligibility.

For ordinary applicants, this means that before applying, they must ensure that land documents clearly state that the lease has already started and that possession has been given. If the lease begins only after LOI or appointment, the application may be rejected even if the candidate is otherwise suitable.

The judgment also underlines that public bodies like IOCL are entitled to insist on strict compliance with their brochures when the conditions go to basic eligibility and fairness between competing candidates.

Legal Issues and Answers

  • Issue: Did the petitioner satisfy IOCL’s basic requirement of having suitable land for LPG godown and showroom as on the date of application, on the strength of lease deeds dated 04.08.2017 and a later rectification deed dated 14.05.2019?
    Answer: No. The original lease deeds made the lease operative only from the date of her appointment as distributor and did not show possession or commencement on 04.08.2017. The rectification deed being subsequent to the application could not cure this basic deficiency.
  • Issue: Could the petitioner rely on earlier Patna High Court judgments where rectification deeds were accepted to support her claim?
    Answer: No. The Court held that those cases were distinguishable: in Shankar Kumar Bhagat the lease had already commenced and possession was given on the execution date, and in Priya Kumari the defect was only a rectifiable typographical error in plot number. Here, the defect related to non-availability of land itself on the application date.
  • Issue: Was IOCL’s decision to cancel the petitioner’s candidature arbitrary or illegal?
    Answer: No. Following the brochure, the precedent in Neeraj Kumar, and the reasoning in Avinash Aarohi, the Court held that IOCL correctly cancelled the candidature because the petitioner did not have land as required on the relevant date.

Cases Cited by the Court

  • 2019 (4) PLJR 663, Shankar Kumar Bhagat vs. The Indian Oil Corporation & Ors.
  • CWJC No. 7292 of 2020, decided on 14.09.2020, Priya Kumari vs. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors.
  • 2009 (3) PLJR 591, Neeraj Kumar vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
  • CWJC No. 11874 of 2019, decided on 30.07.2019, Avinash Aarohi vs. The Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors.

Case Details

Case Number: Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 23654 of 2019

Case Title: Guriya Kumari vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors.

Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

Date of Judgment: 24.12.2021

Citation: 2022 (1) PLJR 325

Advocates:

  • For the Petitioner: Mr. Siddartha Prasad, Advocate
  • For the Respondent Corporation (Indian Oil Corporation Limited): Mr. K.D. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate; Mr. Amlesh Kumar Verma, Advocate

Nature of the Case: Writ petition challenging cancellation of LPG distributorship candidature and subsequent fresh draw of lots

Link to Judgment: View full judgment on Patna High Court website

If you found this explanation helpful and wish to stay informed about how legal developments may affect your rights in Bihar, you may consider following Samvida Law Associates for more updates.

Facing a similar matter before the Patna High Court? Contact Samvida Law Associates.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Recent News