Case Background
This case arises out of a dispute over the allotment of a retail petrol outlet dealership at Brahmpur, Buxar, by Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL).
The petitioner had applied for the same dealership. In the merit list prepared after interview on 23.07.2008, the petitioner stood at second position while respondent no. 10 was selected.
Earlier, the petitioner had filed Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 10224 of 2009 before the Patna High Court. There he challenged the selection of respondent no. 10 mainly on the ground that a tanker bearing registration no. BR44G/3575, associated with respondent no. 10 and Baba Brahmeshwar Nath Filling Station, Brahmpur, Buxar, had allegedly failed a market test on 28.05.2007 and the pump was suspended by IOCL. He also raised issues about criminal proceedings said to be pending against respondent no. 10.
In CWJC No. 10224 of 2009, the High Court, by order dated 30.01.2015, did not accept the petitioner’s claim that respondent no. 10 automatically stood disqualified due to alleged false declaration about a criminal case. However, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to approach IOCL authorities and try to satisfy them that respondent no. 10 was disqualified on account of pendency of a criminal case.
Acting on this liberty, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation dated 09.09.2017 to IOCL. He asserted that, at the time of allotment, a criminal case was pending against respondent no. 10; that a chargesheet had been filed; and that these facts had not been disclosed in the affidavit submitted to IOCL. He alleged that despite being given relevant documents, IOCL officials, under alleged influence, still granted the dealership to respondent no. 10.
IOCL considered the representation and disposed of it by a reasoned order communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 20.09.2017 (Annexure-11). In this letter IOCL concluded that the affidavit of respondent no. 10 was not contrary to facts and that she was not disqualified under the advertisement terms.
Feeling aggrieved by this order and IOCL’s refusal to cancel the dealership, the petitioner filed the present Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 12241 of 2018 before the Patna High Court.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The petitioner sought three main reliefs:
First, a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash part of the IOCL order dated 20.12.2017 (communicated by letter dated 20.09.2017) passed by respondent no. 7, where IOCL recorded that the statement made by respondent no. 10 in para 7 of her affidavit was not contrary to facts.
Second, a writ of mandamus to direct IOCL to cancel the dealership of respondent no. 10 and appoint the petitioner as dealer, as he was second in the select list and had no criminal case pending or adverse remarks.
Third, any other suitable order.
The core dispute in this second round of litigation was whether respondent no. 10 was ineligible for the dealership because of a pending criminal case and whether her affidavit to IOCL was false or misleading.
Petitioner’s stand
The petitioner, through senior counsel, argued that IOCL authorities were aware that Buxar (Town) P.S. Case No. 197 of 1989 was pending against respondent no. 10, in which the court had taken cognizance on 07.03.2007.
He submitted that at the time when respondent no. 10 applied for the retail outlet, she was an accused in a criminal case and was also shown as absconder for the purpose of framing of charges. Therefore, according to the petitioner, she should have been treated as disqualified under the advertisement. He contended that IOCL arbitrarily allotted the outlet to respondent no. 10 despite her alleged disqualification and non-disclosure.
The petitioner’s side relied on several Supreme Court judgments, including decisions in Ramchandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, ABL International Ltd. v. ECGC, Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P., and Union of India v. N. Murugesan. However, the Patna High Court later held that these citations did not apply to the facts of the present case and therefore did not discuss them in detail.
IOCL’s defence
IOCL (respondent nos. 1 to 9) filed a detailed counter affidavit. They relied on clause 4 of the advertisement which laid down the eligibility condition:
“Candidates convicted for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude/economic offence and those against whom charges have been framed by the court (other than for freedom struggle) are not eligible to apply.”
IOCL emphasised that, under the advertisement, two separate conditions were relevant:
- Conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude or economic offence; or
- Framing of charges by a court in such an offence.
Only if either of these existed as on the date of advertisement or application would a candidate be ineligible.
IOCL stated that respondent no. 10 had submitted an affidavit dated 23.07.2007 declaring that no charges were framed against her by any criminal court and that she had not been made accused in any criminal case involving moral turpitude or economic offence punishable in law.
IOCL acknowledged that Sessions Trial No. 390/2006 arising out of Buxar Town P.S. Case No. 197/1989 had been registered against several persons including respondent no. 10. The police submitted a chargesheet against six accused persons, including her, on 07.03.2007 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar, and cognizance was taken.
However, IOCL pointed out that respondent no. 10 and two others had filed a petition on 02.09.2006 asserting that they were minors at the time of the incident. The court, by order dated 04.01.2007, split up their case and sent it to the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) for separate proceedings. The split-up records were sent to JJB, Buxar on 10.08.2010 and registered as JJB Case No. 217/13 (State v. Kamlesh Tiwari & Ors.).
Importantly, IOCL submitted that charges were framed by the Sessions Court on 16.03.2007 only against three adult accused, and no charges were framed against respondent no. 10 in that court. Further, on perusal of the JJB record, IOCL found that charges had not been framed against respondent no. 10 in JJB Case No. 217/13 up to March 2013.
Thus, according to IOCL, on the date of advertisement and on the date of submission of the affidavit, respondent no. 10 had neither been convicted in any criminal case nor had any charges been framed against her. Therefore, she did not fall within the disqualification clause and her affidavit was not false.
IOCL also stated that selection of dealership was conducted as per prevailing selection guidelines and that marks were awarded accordingly.
Respondent no. 10’s reply
Respondent no. 10 also filed a counter affidavit. She confirmed that Buxar P.S. Case No. 197 of 1989 was registered against several persons including her, but she was declared a juvenile and the Sessions Court did not frame charges against her. She stated that the Juvenile Justice Board, Buxar framed charges against her and two others only on 05.07.2018, long after the advertisement and selection process.
She further pointed out that she was ultimately exonerated in that criminal case by order dated 06.03.2020 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board.
Her senior counsel submitted that after earlier litigation, the matter had gone to the Supreme Court and, following that decision, candidates were again subjected to interview and evaluation. Respondent no. 10 was asked by letter dated 04.07.2008 to submit a fresh affidavit, which she did on 23.07.2008.
She explained that any alleged typing mistake in the application did not alter the core requirement: the declaration was about criminal cases where charges had been framed or conviction existed for offences of moral turpitude/economic offences. Since, as on the relevant dates, she had neither been charged nor convicted, there was no reason or legal requirement to disclose the mere pendency of a case where charges had not yet been framed.
Respondent no. 10 further contended that she had made heavy investments after selection, obtained various NOCs and licences, developed the site, constructed structures and commissioned the outlet. She emphasised that even under section 19 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, conviction of a juvenile does not operate as a disqualification, and records are to be removed to prevent lifelong stigma.
She alleged that the petitioner’s approach, in repeatedly raising and publicising the juvenile case, ran contrary to the protective spirit of the Juvenile Justice law.
Court’s analysis of the legal framework
The Court first examined the terms of the advertisement dated 01.09.2000. Column 4, reproduced in the judgment, stated that candidates convicted for criminal offences of moral turpitude/economic offences, and those against whom charges have been framed by a court (other than for freedom struggle), were not eligible to apply.
The Court then analysed the application form (Annexure-14) filled by respondent no. 10. Column 20 of the form asked whether the applicant had ever been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude/economic offence, or whether any case was pending in court, or if any court had framed charges. It required details if the answer was “yes” and an affidavit if “no”. Respondent no. 10 answered that there was nothing of that sort and enclosed an affidavit.
The petitioner insisted that because a criminal case was pending against respondent no. 10, her “no” answer was wrong and she was disqualified.
The Court compared the advertisement and the content of the application form. It noted that the real eligibility condition flowed from the advertisement, not from any stray or imperfect drafting in the form. The disqualification arose only if a person had been convicted or if charges had been framed as on the relevant date. Mere pendency of a criminal case without framing of charges was not a bar.
The Court also noted from the record that respondent no. 10 had been treated as a juvenile in the criminal case, the main case had been split and sent to the Juvenile Justice Board, and charges had not been framed against her as on the date of application.
Precedents relied on by the Court
The Court then referred to and applied decisions of the Supreme Court and of the Patna High Court on similar issues.
In Virendra Chaudhary v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [(2009) 1 SCC 297], the Supreme Court had emphasised that selected candidates do not acquire an indefeasible right, but relief under Article 226 is discretionary. Where a selected candidate has invested heavily and a letter of intent and dealership have been acted upon for a long time, courts should be cautious about disturbing such arrangements, especially when there is delay and laches.
The Court also cited a coordinate bench judgment in Pankaj Kumar v. State of Bihar (CWJC No. 2688 of 2022), which discussed the modern approach of the justice system to reform rather than permanently brand individuals as criminals, and referenced the Supreme Court’s ruling in Avtar Singh v. Union of India [(2016) 8 SCC 471]. In Avtar Singh, the Supreme Court held that in trivial matters or cases where, even if disclosed, the offence would not render a person unfit for the post, the employer may ignore suppression of minor criminal antecedents.
Another coordinate bench decision in Kaushal Kishore v. Union of India [(2000) 2 PLJR 475] was examined. There, the Patna High Court, relying on Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489], held that where a dealership has become functional and the dealer has made heavy investments, it may not be a sound exercise of writ jurisdiction to cancel the dealership after a long lapse of time, even if some irregularity is shown.
Relying on these authorities, the Court in the present case took into account not only the exact wording of IOCL’s advertisement but also the practical realities of dealership operations and investments made by respondent no. 10 over the years.
Conclusion and dismissal of the writ
On a cumulative reading of the advertisement, the application form, the criminal case record, and the precedents, the Court held that respondent no. 10 could not be disqualified merely because of the pendency of a criminal case in which no charges had been framed against her as on the date of application.
The Court found that she had been treated as a juvenile, her case had been separated and sent to the Juvenile Justice Board, and charges were not framed against her at the relevant time. Therefore, her affidavit to IOCL was not contrary to facts under the criteria stated in the advertisement.
The Court also noted, by reference to the case law, that respondent no. 10 had made substantial investments and had been running the outlet, and that disturbing such an arrangement at this late stage, without clear illegality or fraud falling within the disqualification clause, was not warranted.
Accordingly, the Court held that IOCL had committed no irregularity in selecting respondent no. 10 as an eligible candidate for the dealership. The writ petition was dismissed.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment clarifies, in very practical terms, how eligibility conditions in public advertisements are to be read.
First, it makes clear that if an advertisement says a candidate is ineligible only when convicted or when charges have been framed, then mere pendency of a criminal case is not enough to disqualify a person. For aspirants and competitors in dealership selections and similar processes, this distinction is crucial.
Second, the case shows that courts will not lightly cancel a dealership many years after allotment, especially when the dealer has made heavy investments and is running the outlet. Even if a rival candidate stands second in the merit list, he does not automatically get the outlet if the first candidate is later challenged.
Third, the judgment underlines the special position of juveniles in criminal law. When a person is treated as a juvenile and their case is before a Juvenile Justice Board, the ordinary stigma and disqualifications attached to criminal proceedings are handled differently. Courts will be slow to permit those past juvenile proceedings to be used to block livelihood opportunities.
For people in Bihar and elsewhere who participate in oil company dealership selections, the ruling offers guidance: eligibility turns on the exact words of the advertisement; allegations of pending criminal cases must be tested strictly against those words; and long delays and existing investments weigh heavily against disturbing an existing dealership.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Does mere pendency of a criminal case, without charges being framed, make a candidate ineligible for IOCL dealership when the advertisement bars only convicted persons or those against whom charges have been framed?
Answer: No. The Patna High Court held that under the relevant advertisement, only conviction or framing of charges triggers disqualification. Mere pendency of a criminal case is not a bar. - Issue: Was the affidavit of respondent no. 10, denying conviction or framing of charges, false so as to warrant cancellation of her dealership?
Answer: No. The Court found that as on the date of the application and affidavit, no charges had been framed against respondent no. 10 and she was not convicted in any criminal case, so her affidavit was not contrary to facts under the advertisement terms. - Issue: Should the Court, in its writ jurisdiction, cancel a functioning dealership and direct allotment to the second-ranked candidate after several years?
Answer: No. Relying on Supreme Court and Patna High Court precedents, the Court held that, given the absence of disqualification and the substantial investments already made by respondent no. 10, there was no ground to interfere, and the writ petition was dismissed.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Virendra Chaudhary v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 297
- Pankaj Kumar v. State of Bihar & Ors., CWJC No. 2688 of 2022 (Patna High Court)
- Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 471
- Kaushal Kishore v. Union of India & Ors., (2000) 2 PLJR 475
- Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 489
- Other Supreme Court and Patna High Court decisions were cited by parties but held inapplicable to the present facts.
Case Details
Case Number: Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 12241 of 2018
Case Title: Binod Kumar Mishra v. The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 (3) PLJR 918
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Coram: Hon’ble Justice Smt. G. Anupama Chakravarthy
Date of Judgment: 13-12-2024
Appearing Advocates:
- For the petitioner: M/s Y.V. Giri, Senior Advocate; Dwivedy Surendra; Dimpal Kumari, Advocates
- For IOCL (respondent nos. 1 to 9): Mr. Ankit Katariar, Advocate
- For respondent no. 10: M/s Anil Kumar Jha, Senior Advocate; Sanat Kumar Jha, Advocate
Nature of the Case: Writ petition (civil) challenging petrol pump dealership selection and seeking cancellation of dealership and mandamus for appointment of petitioner as dealer.
Link to Judgment: Patna High Court Judgment in CWJC No. 12241 of 2018
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