Case Background
The case arose from Bettiah Muffasil P.S. Case No. 626 of 2013, registered in West Champaran district. The first information report was lodged on the statement of a girl described as the victim and examined in trial as PW 4.
According to the FIR version, on 28.09.2013 at about 8:00 PM, the victim, then said to be about 12 years old, went to relieve herself near the fields. Near the field of one Nand Kishore Prasad, the appellant allegedly caught hold of her, dragged her inside the paddy crop, removed her lower garments and committed rape. He allegedly threatened her not to disclose the incident and then fled.
The victim is said to have returned home but, out of fear, did not tell anyone immediately. The family members, however, sensed that something had happened and took her to the police station, where the FIR was written and registered. After investigation, the police submitted a charge sheet against the appellant and the case went to trial before the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, West Champaran, Bettiah.
By judgment dated 07.01.2020, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. By order dated 28.01.2020, it sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 15,000 under both heads, with two years’ rigorous imprisonment in default. The sentences were to run concurrently.
The appellant then filed Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 749 of 2020 before the Patna High Court, challenging both the conviction and the sentence.
What the Court Examined and Decided
Justice Birendra Kumar of the Patna High Court examined the entire trial record, including the testimonies of five prosecution witnesses and the reasoning adopted by the trial court.
PW 1 and PW 2 were co-villagers of the informant. Both stated that they knew nothing about the occurrence. The prosecution declared them hostile. Their evidence did not support the prosecution case in any way.
PW 3 was the father of the victim. He stated that on the date of occurrence he was not in the village. After coming back, the victim told him only that the appellant had caught her arm. Importantly, this was all he said about what his daughter disclosed. He was not declared hostile, so his version bound the prosecution.
PW 4, the victim, in her examination-in-chief broadly supported the FIR version about being dragged into the field and ravished by the appellant. On that basis, the trial court had accepted her as a reliable witness.
However, in cross-examination, crucial parts of her testimony changed. She stated that neither she nor her father had given any written report to the police. According to her, the written report was penned by “Darogaji”, whose name she did not know, and it was not read over to her. This raised doubts about the origin and correctness of the FIR itself.
Even more importantly, she said that due to darkness and absence of light at the place and time of occurrence, she could not identify anyone by face. She admitted that she had not named the appellant in the written report; rather, villagers who accompanied her to the police station had got his name written. No such villager came forward in trial to support that they had named the appellant after witnessing anything.
The victim further stated that she never had any complaint against the appellant and still had none; the appellant treated her as a sister. She also said that since he was her “brother”, she identified him in court. These answers seriously weakened her identification of the appellant as the assailant.
PW 5, Dr. Rashmi Nand Kuliyar, examined the victim on 30.09.2013. She found secondary sexual characteristics developed, both breasts developed, axillary and pubic hair present, and no injury on the private parts. The hymen was old ruptured. On radiological report, she said, the victim was “around 15 years” of age. No spermatozoa was found on pathological examination.
The trial court, when convicting, had mainly relied on five factors. First, it accepted the doctor’s assessment that the victim was 15 years old and treated her as a minor, noting that rural poor families rarely have written proof of date of birth. Second, it relied on an alleged statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before a Magistrate, which was said to be consistent with the FIR. Third, it considered the cross-examination of the victim insufficient to shake her examination-in-chief. Fourth, it brushed aside the non-examination of the Investigating Officer as non-prejudicial to the defence. Fifth, it invoked the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, holding that the defence had failed to rebut them.
Before the High Court, the appellant’s counsel argued that this approach reversed basic criminal law principles. He submitted that the initial burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt always lies on the prosecution, and presumptions like those in the POCSO Act arise only after that burden is at least prima facie discharged. Here, he said, the prosecution case itself was shaky.
He pointed out that the victim had disowned giving a written report; there was no evidence from the Investigating Officer about who actually wrote the FIR or how the case developed. There was also no evidence from any Magistrate or witness about a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., though the trial court had relied on such a statement. Counsel further highlighted the conflict between the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4, and the lack of clear proof of the victim’s age.
The State’s counsel countered that once a prosecutrix states she was ravished, her statement alone can be sufficient, especially in offences which usually occur away from public view.
The High Court carefully evaluated these rival stands. It noted that neither PW 3 nor PW 4 explained who wrote the first information report; they only identified their signatures. None of the witnesses, including the victim, said anything about a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate. In such a situation, the court held, the gap could not be filled by guesswork. Non-examination of the Investigating Officer, who could have clarified the FIR and any Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, was a serious lapse that prejudiced the defence.
The Court then turned to the reliability of the victim’s evidence. It found that she was not a “sterling witness”. A sterling witness is one whose version remains consistent and trustworthy even after cross-examination. Here, in cross-examination, the victim clearly said she could not identify the miscreant due to darkness and admitted that villagers, not she, had named the appellant in the FIR. She also affirmed that she had no complaint against the appellant and considered him like a brother.
Justice Birendra Kumar held that the trial court could not have ignored these specific answers and relied only on the examination-in-chief. A witness’s testimony must be read as a whole. Unless a part is clearly separable and ignorable, it is wrong to rely only on one part and discard the rest.
The High Court also looked at the evidence of PW 3, the father. He said that his daughter had only disclosed that the appellant had caught her hand. He was not declared hostile. Citing the Supreme Court decision in Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, the Court noted that when a prosecution witness is not declared hostile, the defence can rely on his evidence and it becomes binding on the prosecution. The clear difference between the father’s limited account and the victim’s more serious allegation in chief deepened the doubt about the prosecution story.
Regarding age, the Court noted that the victim was literate and had signed wherever needed. It was not the prosecution case that she never attended school. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court had held that the age of a rape victim should be determined following Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. That rule gives priority to school and birth records, and only in their absence allows reliance on medical opinion.
In the present case, no school record, matriculation certificate, or birth certificate was produced. Only the doctor’s approximate opinion of “around 15 years” was available. The Court referred to Supreme Court rulings in Sunil v. State of Haryana and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Munna @ Shambhoo Nath, which state that conviction cannot rest on approximate age alone and that such evidence is insufficient to conclude the exact age of a victim.
The High Court further underlined that the doctor who deposed (PW 5) herself had not carried out the radiological examination; therefore, her estimate without producing the radiologist or the radiological report was not a safe basis to determine age. Her testimony was held “worthless” for proving exact age. As a result, the prosecution had failed in its bounden duty to establish that the victim was a child so as to attract Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
On the POCSO presumptions under Sections 29 and 30, the Court explained that these are rebuttable presumptions and arise only after the prosecution first proves the basic facts of the offence. Here, because the victim’s testimony was not wholly reliable, the FIR’s origin and contents were doubtful, and the victim’s age was not proved, the initial burden had not been discharged. Therefore, the trial court was wrong in invoking the presumptions against the accused.
Overall, Justice Birendra Kumar concluded that the case suffered from several serious infirmities. These included non-examination of the Investigating Officer, lack of proof about any Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, contradictions between the victim and her father, the victim’s own admissions weakening identification, absence of injuries or medical support, and failure to prove the victim’s age in the legally required manner.
In view of these deficiencies, the High Court held that it was not a fit case where conviction could be sustained. The trial court had erred both in law and in appreciating the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction dated 07.01.2020 and sentence dated 28.01.2020 were set aside, the appeal was allowed, and the Court directed that the appellant be set free at once.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is significant for both accused persons and complainants in sexual offence cases, especially under the POCSO Act.
First, it reaffirms that even in sensitive cases, the prosecution must still prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Courts cannot fill evidentiary gaps with assumptions, however serious the allegation may be.
Second, it clarifies that for offences under the POCSO Act, the age of the victim must be proved with proper documents such as school or birth records. A rough medical estimate is not enough to treat someone as a “child” in law.
Third, it shows that the victim’s testimony must remain consistent throughout. If in cross-examination the victim cannot identify the accused or contradicts earlier statements, courts must take that seriously and not rely only on the initial version.
Fourth, it underlines the importance of the Investigating Officer’s evidence. Where the FIR and alleged statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. are in doubt, failure to examine the Investigating Officer can fatally weaken the prosecution.
For families and victims, this case underlines the need to give clear, truthful statements from the beginning and to ensure age documents are preserved and produced. For accused persons, it shows that higher courts will intervene where trial courts misapply legal presumptions and ignore contradictions.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Whether the conviction for rape and under Section 4 of the POCSO Act could be sustained on the sole testimony of the victim and an approximate medical assessment of age, despite contradictions and non-examination of the Investigating Officer.
Answer: No. The Patna High Court held that the victim was not a wholly reliable or “sterling” witness, the prosecution failed to prove her exact age as required by law, and serious lapses like non-examination of the Investigating Officer created reasonable doubt, requiring acquittal. - Issue: Whether presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act could be invoked when the prosecution had not first discharged its initial burden of proof.
Answer: No. The Court held that these are rebuttable presumptions that arise only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts. Since that had not been done, the trial court wrongly relied on these presumptions. - Issue: Whether approximate medical opinion on age, without supporting documents or radiological report, is sufficient to hold the victim to be a child under POCSO.
Answer: No. Relying on Supreme Court precedents and Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, the Court held that priority must be given to school and birth records, and approximate medical age alone cannot sustain a POCSO conviction.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 5 SCC 272 – on the binding nature of testimony of a non-hostile prosecution witness.
- Sunil v. State of Haryana, AIR 2010 SC 392 – holding that conviction cannot be based on approximate age of the victim.
- State of Madhya Pradesh v. Munna @ Shambhoo Nath, (2016) 1 SCC 696 – on insufficiency of approximate age evidence to determine exact age.
- Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013 Cri. L.J. 3976 – on determining age of a rape victim as per Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007.
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 749 of 2020; arising out of Bettiah Muffasil P.S. Case No. 626 of 2013, CIS No. 10914 of 2014.
Case Title: Sikandar Patel v. The State of Bihar.
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Birendra Kumar.
Citation: 2022(1) PLJR 83.
Advocates: Mr. Umesh Chandra Verma, Advocate for the appellant; Mr. Syed Ashfaque Ahmad, Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.
Nature of the Case: Criminal appeal against conviction and sentence under Section 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, West Champaran, Bettiah.
Date of High Court Judgment: 20.12.2021.
Outcome: Conviction and sentence set aside; appeal allowed; appellant directed to be released.
Link to Judgment: Full text of Patna High Court judgment
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