Case Background
This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.09.2004, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.5, Motihari, in Sessions Trial No. 189/1988 and 12/2002.
The trial court had convicted the appellant under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years under each section, with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- on each count. In default of payment of fine, he was to undergo further rigorous imprisonment of six months. All sentences were to run concurrently.
The prosecution case started with a fardbayan given by the informant, the father of the alleged victim, before Raxaul GRP on 02.01.1984 at about 1:00 P.M. On that basis, Raxaul G.R. P.S. Case No. 1/84 was registered under Sections 366/379/411/34 IPC. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted under Sections 363, 364, 366 and 379 IPC and cognizance was taken. The case was committed to the Court of Session, and on 08.04.2002 charges were framed against the appellant under Sections 363, 366 and 379 IPC.
During trial, the prosecution examined only two witnesses: the informant (father of the victim) as P.W. 1, and the victim herself as P.W. 2. The Investigating Officer and the doctor were not examined. After trial, the appellant was convicted under Sections 363 and 366 IPC; the charge under Section 379 IPC did not result in conviction.
By the time the appeal came up for final hearing before the Patna High Court, it had been pending for nearly 21 years. On 06.12.2025, none appeared for the appellant. The Court, therefore, requested assistance and appointed Ms. Pooja Prasad as Amicus Curiae to represent the appellant. The State was represented by the learned A.P.P.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Patna High Court examined whether the prosecution had proved the offences under Sections 363 and 366 IPC against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the original fardbayan, the informant stated that his elder daughter (the victim) served him food and then went to another room where his younger two-year-old daughter was sleeping. After finishing his meal, he heard the younger child crying. He went to the room and found it locked from outside. He broke the lock using a stone and discovered that a large wooden box containing clothes, jewellery, household items and cash was missing, and his elder daughter was also not there.
He claimed that on enquiry he learnt that the appellant and two others had kidnapped his daughter and had stolen the box. He then rushed to Raxaul Railway Station, where he allegedly found the appellant and one co-accused with his daughter, and caught them. A stolen watch was said to be in the hand of the appellant. Raxaul GRP thereafter arrested the appellant and registered the FIR.
At the appellate stage, the Amicus Curiae argued that even on the prosecution evidence, kidnapping was not made out. The father (P.W. 1) himself had stated that his daughter was about 17–18 years old at the time of occurrence and had admitted that she went with the appellant of her own free will. There was no evidence of inducement or force by the appellant to take the girl away from lawful guardianship.
It was further contended that non-examination of the Investigating Officer seriously prejudiced the defence, as the place of occurrence could not be properly established and contradictions in the statements of witnesses could not be tested. Hence, the conviction was said to be unsustainable.
The State argued that the conviction was based on material on record. As per the FIR, the age of the victim was 15 years. Though there were discrepancies in the evidence of P.W. 1, the overall prosecution story was supported by P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and should not be discarded.
The Court first evaluated the testimony of P.W. 1, the informant and father of the victim. In his examination-in-chief, P.W. 1 estimated the victim’s age as 17–18 years. He supported the allegation that the wooden box was in the room and that his daughter was found at Raxaul station with the appellant and another person, and that a stolen watch was with the appellant.
However, during cross-examination, P.W. 1 changed his stand. He admitted that he knew the appellant, identified him as his son-in-law, and stated that the marriage between the appellant and his daughter had taken place with his consent. He further admitted that the criminal case was filed at the behest of villagers. He denied the allegation that the wooden box had gone missing, saying it was found in his house and that all articles were present. He also admitted that he himself had given the watch and a ring to the appellant. Crucially, he conceded that his daughter had gone with the appellant of her own will.
The Court noted that this amounted to a complete “u-turn” from the FIR. The testimony of P.W. 1 was found to be contradictory, unreliable and lacking authenticity. On this basis, his evidence was not considered trustworthy.
The Court then examined the evidence of P.W. 2, the victim. In her deposition, she stated that she went to the appellant’s house, and from there he took her to Riga and then to Bairganiya, where they stayed for two days in a hut. She stated that her father saw them at Raxaul station, after which the appellant was apprehended and her statement was recorded before the Magistrate. In cross-examination, she admitted that she had gone with the appellant and that she was in love with him.
The Court compared this with her earlier statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., where she had given a very different version. There, she claimed to be 14 years old and described a forcible abduction by villagers, tying of her mouth, and her being handed over to the appellant. She had further alleged that the appellant forcibly took her to railway stations, kept her in a hut for two days, and committed rape under threat, until she was recovered at Raxaul station.
The High Court found that the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was totally inconsistent with her evidence in court. P.W. 2 did not support the prosecution story in her oral testimony; instead, she spoke of going with the appellant voluntarily and being in love with him. The doctor who allegedly examined her was never produced and there was no medical document on record. In these circumstances, the Court held that her evidence did not inspire confidence and was unsafe to rely upon.
The Court reiterated that evidence given in court on oath, with an opportunity for cross-examination, is the substantive evidence. Statements under Sections 154, 161 or 164 Cr.P.C. can only be used for corroboration or contradiction. Referring to R. Shaji v. State of Kerala (2013) 14 SCC 266, the Court observed that statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. are not themselves substantive evidence and cannot replace testimony in court.
On the issue of age, the Court observed that the prosecution case in the FIR described the victim as 15 years old. However, during evidence, P.W. 1 stated that she was about 17–18 years old and admitted that he was only giving an approximate age without any record. There was no school certificate, birth certificate or medical opinion on age. The Court relied on Supreme Court judgments like Sunil v. State of Haryana (AIR 2010 SC 392), State of Madhya Pradesh v. Munna @ Shambhoo Nath (2016) 1 SCC 696, and Rajak Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018 SCC OnLine SC 1222), which hold that conviction cannot be based on approximate age and that doubts about exact age must go in favour of the accused.
On this basis, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident. This was vital because offences under Sections 363 and 366 IPC are built around taking a minor from lawful guardianship or kidnapping a woman to force marriage or illicit intercourse.
The Court also stressed the importance of the Investigating Officer’s evidence. Relying on Behari Prasad v. State of Bihar (1996) 2 SCC 317, it noted that while non-examination of the Investigating Officer is not automatically fatal in every case, it can be a serious infirmity wherever it causes prejudice to the accused. Here, the prosecution version contained several contradictions and omissions, and only the Investigating Officer could have clarified them or properly established the place of occurrence.
Citing Syed Ibrahim v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 601, the Court observed that where the place of occurrence itself is not firmly established, it is unsafe to accept the prosecution case. In this matter, due to non-examination of the Investigating Officer, the place of occurrence remained unproved and the defence could not effectively confront the witnesses with their earlier statements.
The Court further considered that the victim was literate, had signed her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, and in her court testimony clearly stated that she joined the company of her husband (the appellant) voluntarily. The father admitted that the marriage had taken place with his consent, and the victim was almost on the verge of majority and capable of deciding her future.
In assessing whether there was “taking” for the purposes of kidnapping, the Court applied the ratio of S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras (AIR 1965 942). The Supreme Court in that case had held that when a nearly-major girl willingly accompanies the accused, there is a distinction between “taking” and merely allowing her to accompany. Without proof of inducement or active participation in forming the intention of the minor to leave her guardian, the offence of kidnapping is not made out.
Applying this principle, the Court found that there was no evidence that the appellant induced or compelled the victim to leave her father’s house. Rather, she voluntarily left and joined him out of love. In such circumstances, the appellant was under no legal duty to return her to her father.
Considering all these aspects—untrustworthy and contradictory evidence of P.W. 1, inconsistent statements of P.W. 2, failure to prove minority, non-examination of the Investigating Officer and doctor, and lack of proof of “taking” or force—the Court held that the prosecution had not proved the charges under Sections 363 and 366 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, the Patna High Court set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 23.09.2004, allowed the appeal, and discharged the appellant from his bail bond obligations. Interlocutory applications, if any, were disposed of, and the trial court records were directed to be returned. The Court also directed the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee to pay Rs. 5,000/- as consolidated fee to the Amicus Curiae for her assistance.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for accused persons and families involved in old kidnapping cases, especially where relationships or love affairs are alleged. The Patna High Court has emphasised that a conviction cannot rest on guesswork about age or on weak, shifting testimony.
If a girl is almost an adult and goes willingly with someone, and there is no proof of force or inducement, the Court may treat the situation differently from a standard kidnapping case. Here, the Court underlined that the prosecution must strictly prove that the victim was a minor and that the accused actually “took” her away from lawful guardianship.
The decision also shows that non-examination of key witnesses like the Investigating Officer and the doctor can seriously undermine the prosecution, particularly when there are contradictions or doubts in the evidence. Victims’ earlier police or magistrate statements are not enough by themselves; what really matters is what they say in court under oath.
For lay readers, the message is clear: criminal convictions, especially for serious offences like kidnapping, must be based on solid, consistent and legally admissible evidence. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal.
Legal Issues and Answers
-
Issue: Did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant kidnapped the victim under Sections 363 and 366 IPC?
Answer: No. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove minority, failed to establish “taking” from lawful guardianship, and relied on contradictory and unreliable evidence. -
Issue: Did non-examination of the Investigating Officer and lack of age proof prejudice the defence to such an extent that conviction could not be sustained?
Answer: Yes. The Court found serious prejudice due to absence of the Investigating Officer, failure to establish the place of occurrence, and lack of reliable age evidence, making conviction unsafe.
Cases Cited by the Court
- R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266
- Sunil v. State of Haryana, AIR 2010 SC 392
- State of Madhya Pradesh v. Munna @ Shambhoo Nath, (2016) 1 SCC 696
- Rajak Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1222
- Behari Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1996) 2 SCC 317
- Syed Ibrahim v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 601
- S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras, AIR 1965 942
Case Details
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.697 of 2004
Case Title: Satrughan Jha v. State of Bihar
Citation: 2026(1) PLJR 643
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Bench/Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Alok Kumar Pandey
Date of Judgment: 06.12.2025
Nature of Case: Criminal appeal against conviction under Sections 363 and 366 IPC
Trial Court: Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.5, Motihari in S.Tr. No. 189/1988 and 12/2002
Offences Alleged: Sections 363, 366, 379 IPC at the stage of charge; conviction ultimately under Sections 363 and 366 IPC only
Appellant’s Counsel: Ms. Pooja Prasad, Amicus Curiae
State Counsel: Mr. Ramchandra Singh, A.P.P.
Link to Full Judgment: Click here to read the judgment of the Patna High Court
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