Case Background
The dispute arises from a land transaction in village Mahathi, under Bibhutipur police station, District Samastipur.
The plaintiff (respondent 1st set) filed Title Suit No. 199 of 2020 before the Sub Judge-IV, Rosera. He sought a decree for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 05.10.2018, said to have been executed in his favour by the defendant (respondent 2nd set), Govind Jha, with related ancillary reliefs.
The defendant appeared, filed his written statement, and contested the suit. While the suit was pending, the intervener-petitioner, Naresh Jha, came to know of the proceedings. He claimed that the suit property was his self-acquired land, purchased long ago, and that his son, the defendant, had no authority to enter into the agreement for sale.
On 07.03.2022, the intervener-petitioner filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to be impleaded as a defendant in the suit. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder on 29.03.2022, opposing this impleadment and praying that the application be rejected.
After hearing both sides, the Sub Judge-IV, Rosera, by order dated 02.02.2023, rejected the impleadment petition. Aggrieved, the intervener-petitioner approached the Patna High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in Civil Miscellaneous Jurisdiction No. 428 of 2023, challenging that order.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Patna High Court, through Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Jha, examined whether the trial court was justified in refusing to add the intervener-petitioner as a defendant in a suit for specific performance based on an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The intervener-petitioner’s case was that he is the exclusive owner of the suit property. He stated that the land was acquired by him through a registered sale deed dated 11.12.1974, and that it was his self-acquired property. According to him, the defendant, his son, had no right, title or interest in the suit property during his lifetime and, therefore, no authority to execute the agreement for sale dated 05.10.2018 with the plaintiff.
He argued that any such agreement, concerning his self-acquired property during his lifetime, was an abuse of the process of court. He therefore claimed that, for proper and just adjudication of the title suit, he must be impleaded as a necessary party.
The petitioner’s counsel further contended that if the defendant had no right over the suit property, the specific performance suit itself was not maintainable. Once the intervener asserted that the land was his self-acquired property and that the defendant had no right to deal with it, the trial court ought to have treated him as a necessary party. Otherwise, any decree passed could adversely affect his rights without him being heard.
The petitioner’s counsel also addressed the general principle that the plaintiff is dominus litis, meaning the master of the suit, and can choose whom to sue. He argued that this is not absolute and that courts have ample power under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC to add or strike out parties in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to secure substantial justice. He emphasized that denial of impleadment would cause irreparable loss to the petitioner regarding his claimed self-acquired property.
To support these submissions, the petitioner relied on several precedents:
He cited Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886, where the Supreme Court held that a person may be added as a party if he has a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, whether concerning movable or immovable property.
He referred to United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqu Begum and others, AIR 1941 FC 16, where the Federal Court distinguished between “necessary” parties, in whose absence no effective decree can be passed, and “proper” parties, whose presence is needed for effective and complete adjudication.
He also relied on a decision of the Patna High Court in Smt. Baby Devi v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2024 (2) BLJ 763, where impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) was allowed even for a person claiming rights over only a portion of the suit land, and on P.C. Varghese v. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi, (2005) 8 SCC 486, to stress that courts may allow claims for possession and partition along with specific performance to avoid multiple proceedings.
On the other hand, the plaintiff/respondent 1st set opposed the petition. His counsel submitted that the civil miscellaneous application was frivolous and no case was made out for interference in the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.
According to the plaintiff, the defendant, Govind Jha, was the owner and in possession of the suit land in Mauza Rosera. To meet his necessity, the defendant agreed to sell the land and executed a deed of Mahadnama (agreement for sale) bearing No. 10971 dated 05.10.2018 in favour of the plaintiff. When the defendant failed to execute a regular sale deed, the plaintiff filed the title suit for specific performance.
The plaintiff asserted that the suit land was not the self-acquired property of the intervener-petitioner. It was said that late Ram Karan Jha had purchased the land in the name of his sons, namely Ramraji Jha and Naresh Jha, and that after partition, the defendant, Govind Jha, got the suit land in his share and came into peaceful possession.
The plaintiff further pointed out that the defendant had previously leased out his share to one Santosh Sahni through a registered lease deed dated 17.10.2014. This was allegedly done in the full knowledge of the petitioner, and he never objected. Later, the defendant executed the Mahadnama of his share in favour of the plaintiff on 05.10.2018, again said to be in the knowledge of the petitioner. The plaintiff argued that the petitioner’s present claim of ignorance about the agreement was incorrect.
On this basis, the plaintiff contended that the defendant rightfully executed the agreement for sale as the property had come to his exclusive share, and he possessed it. Hence, in a suit for specific performance of that agreement, the intervener-petitioner, who was not a party to the agreement, was neither a necessary nor a proper party. The trial court, according to the plaintiff, rightly rejected the impleadment, observing that the petitioner could pursue an independent remedy if he so desired.
The High Court then turned to the legal framework. It reproduced and considered Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, which empowers the court at any stage of proceedings to strike out improperly joined parties or add any person whose presence is necessary for effectual and complete adjudication of all questions involved in the suit.
The Court noted that this power is discretionary but must be exercised to ensure full and effective resolution of the dispute. It referred to Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417, where the Supreme Court explained that the provision is about the court’s judicial discretion to add or delete parties, exercised according to reason and fair play, not whim.
The Court further relied on Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384, which summarised key principles: a necessary party is one without whom no effective decree can be passed; a proper party is one whose presence enables complete adjudication; and if a person is neither necessary nor proper, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him against the plaintiff’s wishes. The decision also clarified that in suits for specific performance, impleadment of a person with a bona fide interest may be allowed.
The Patna High Court also considered Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733, where the Supreme Court held that in suits for specific performance, a stranger to the contract cannot ordinarily be added as a defendant. However, it noted the later decision in Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), (2007) 10 SCC 82, which clarified that Kasturi applies only where the third party has no semblance of title. In Sumtibai, the Court held that a busybody with no title cannot be impleaded, but where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest, impleadment can be justified.
Further, the High Court took note of Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886, where it was held that in property suits, a third party may be impleaded if he has a direct or legal interest in the subject matter, and that the result of the suit would affect him legally.
Applying this legal position to the facts, the Patna High Court observed that the suit property was admittedly purchased in the names of the petitioner and his brother on 11.12.1974. The petitioner claimed that the property is in his peaceful possession, that it consists of a house and vacant land, and that he holds complete right, title and interest over it.
While the plaintiff maintained that after partition the defendant became owner of the specific suit portion, the Court found that the petitioner had clearly demonstrated an interest in the title to the disputed property. The Court held that he could not be treated as a mere busybody or interloper.
The Court reasoned that if the plaintiff were to succeed in the specific performance suit, the outcome would legally affect the intervener-petitioner, because it would directly impact his claimed title and possession. Thus, he had a direct and legal interest in the controversy, satisfying the test laid down in Kasturi, as clarified by Sumtibai, and in Razia Begum.
The Court also observed that the petitioner had shown “more than a semblance of interest” by asserting exclusive ownership of the suit property, based on the 1974 registered sale deed. In such circumstances, any decree passed in his absence could be ineffective, particularly if his claim to right, title and interest was ultimately found sustainable.
Importantly, the Court held that forcing the intervener-petitioner to pursue a separate, independent suit would only multiply litigation and obstruct effective and complete adjudication of the lis pending in the specific performance suit. Bringing him into the same suit would enable all rival claims over the property to be examined together.
On this reasoning, the High Court concluded that the intervener-petitioner ought to have been made a party defendant in the title suit. It held that the trial court had committed an error of jurisdiction by dismissing the impleadment petition.
Accordingly, the Patna High Court set aside the order dated 02.02.2023 passed by the Sub Judge-IV, Rosera in Title Suit No. 199 of 2020. It allowed the petitioner’s application dated 07.03.2022 under Order I Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 CPC, and consequently allowed the civil miscellaneous petition.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for landowners in Bihar and elsewhere who find that their land is being dealt with in court without their knowledge.
The Patna High Court has clarified that where an elderly landowner can show a registered sale deed in his name and a clear claim of possession, he cannot be sidelined in a specific performance suit merely because he did not sign the later agreement.
The ruling reinforces that in property disputes, especially involving family members, courts must look beyond the formal agreement and see whose legal rights over the land will actually be affected by the decree. If the outcome of the case will directly hit someone’s title, that person should normally be heard in the same suit.
Practically, this reduces the risk of multiple, overlapping cases over the same land, saves time and costs, and provides greater protection to original purchasers and recorded owners. It also signals to purchasers and litigants that they cannot safely ignore persons with recorded title and then resist their impleadment by simply calling them “strangers” to the contract.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Can a recorded purchaser claiming self-acquired ownership of suit land be impleaded as a defendant in a suit for specific performance of a later agreement executed by his son?
Answer: Yes. The Patna High Court held that since the petitioner had a direct and legal interest in the suit property, and the decree would directly affect his rights, he is a necessary/proper party and must be impleaded under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC. - Issue: Did the trial court act within its jurisdiction in rejecting the impleadment application of the intervener-petitioner?
Answer: No. The High Court held that the trial court committed an error of jurisdiction by dismissing the application despite the petitioner’s demonstrated legal interest, and therefore set aside the impugned order.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417
- Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384
- Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733
- Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), (2007) 10 SCC 82
- Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886
- United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqu Begum and others, AIR 1941 FC 16
- Smt. Baby Devi v. State of Bihar & Ors, 2024 (2) BLJ 763
- P.C. Varghese v. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi and others, (2005) 8 SCC 486
Case Details
Case Number: Civil Miscellaneous Jurisdiction No. 428 of 2023
Case Title: Naresh Jha v. Chandan Kumar & Anr.
Citation: 2025(3) PLJR 446
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Jha
Date of Judgment: 22.05.2025
Impugned Order: Order dated 02.02.2023 passed by Sub Judge-IV, Rosera in Title Suit No. 199 of 2020
Nature of the Case: Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging rejection of an application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 CPC in a title suit for specific performance of contract.
Advocates for Petitioner: Md. Waliur Rahman, Advocate; Mr. Kumar Praveen, Advocate
Advocates for Respondents: Mr. Binod Bihari Sinha, Advocate; Mr. Amarjeet Chaudhary, Advocate; Mr. Ajay Dutt Mishra, Advocate
Link to Judgment: Click here to read the full judgment of the Patna High Court
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