Case Background
The petitioner is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Microbiology, Faculty of Basic Science and Humanities, at Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University, Pusa, Samastipur.
On 18.05.2025, the Deputy Registrar (Establishment) of the University issued Office Order No. 76 with approval of the “competent authority”. By this order, the petitioner was transferred from Pusa to Banana Research Centre, Goroul, Vaishali (BRC, Goroul).
On 28.05.2025, the Dean, College of Basic Science and Humanities, issued Office Order No. 20, relieving the petitioner with effect from 28.05.2025 to enable her to join at BRC, Goroul, Vaishali.
After being relieved, the petitioner joined at BRC, Goroul on 29.05.2025 in the office of the In-charge. Her joining was accepted.
Despite this, she approached the Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging both the transfer order dated 18.05.2025 and the relieving order dated 28.05.2025. She alleged lack of legal power to transfer, punitive effect, absence of public interest, and mala fides.
What the Court Examined and Decided
The Patna High Court heard detailed arguments from both sides. The core dispute was not about whether a university employee can generally be transferred. The real question was: who, under the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University Act, 2016 and its Statutes, actually has the power to transfer a teacher?
The petitioner’s counsel argued first that the transfer effectively reduced her status and was punitive. She was serving as Assistant Professor in Microbiology at Pusa, with no post of Assistant Professor in Microbiology available at BRC, Goroul.
The transfer order did not state what exact post she would hold at BRC, Goroul. According to her, there was no teaching facility there suited to her specialisation in microbiology, so her services would be of no real use.
The petitioner also stressed her academic responsibilities at Pusa. She was acting as Principal Investigator of a University-funded project for three years under Office Order dated 21.09.2024. The transfer in the middle of this period would disturb that project. She was also guiding 11 M.Sc. (Agriculture) students and 3 Ph.D. scholars whose work, she said, would be adversely affected.
On the legal side, she relied on the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University Act, 2016. Section 12(1) provides that the Vice-Chancellor is appointed by the Visitor. Section 12(2) describes the Vice-Chancellor as the principal executive and academic officer of the University, with general supervision and control over its affairs and the duty to give effect to the decisions of all authorities.
The petitioner pointed to Statute 3(4), which repeats that the Vice-Chancellor exercises control over the affairs of the University and enforces decisions of its authorities, along with disciplinary powers and the power to convene meetings.
However, she emphasised that nowhere in the Act, 2016 or the Statutes is any express power of transfer conferred on the Vice-Chancellor. She contrasted this with the earlier Bihar Agricultural University Act, 1987 (repealed), where under Section 11.1(iii) the Vice-Chancellor expressly had transfer power.
According to her, this deliberate omission in the 2016 Act meant that the Vice-Chancellor no longer had transfer power. She also argued that, under the Service and Recruitment Rules (Teaching Employees), 2017 (an Ordinance), the Board of Management is the appointing and disciplinary authority for teachers, and has powers such as appointing heads of institutions and confirming services. Therefore, she said, only the Board of Management could legally order transfer of a teacher, as envisaged in Statute 12(4).
She further claimed mala fides, stating that the Vice-Chancellor harboured personal bias due to her recognised contributions in microbiology, her research work, supervision of students, and funded projects. She also mentioned personal difficulties: two minor children in senior classes, an aged mother-in-law, and her husband’s posting outside Bihar. She relied on Supreme Court judgments including Ramadhar Pandey v. State of U.P. and Dr. Ramesh Chandra Tyagi v. Union of India to support her contentions on public interest in transfer and competence of the transferring authority.
On the other hand, the University, through its Senior Counsel, defended the transfer firmly. It argued that Section 12(2) of the 2016 Act, by calling the Vice-Chancellor the principal executive and academic officer with general supervision and control over the affairs of the University, impliedly included the power to transfer employees.
The University produced the petitioner’s appointment letter (Annexure-R/1). Clause 13 stated that “the posts are transferable, in the interest of work, the appointed candidates are liable to transfer at any place at the territorial jurisdiction at Rajendra Agricultural University”. The appointment letter also showed that it was the Vice-Chancellor who had offered appointment to the petitioner as Assistant Professor-cum-Junior Scientist.
On this basis, the University claimed that the Vice-Chancellor was the competent authority to transfer her, and her post was inherently transferable. They also stated that the transfer was not punitive. Instead, there was a requirement for a Soil Scientist at BRC, Goroul. The petitioner, having been promoted from Level-11 to Level-12 as a Soil Scientist and with nearly two decades’ experience in soil science and soil microbiology, was considered the most suitable person to strengthen BRC, Goroul.
The University further argued that, as she had already joined at BRC, Goroul and her joining had been accepted, she was estopped from challenging the transfer. They invoked the principles of estoppel, waiver, and acquiescence.
They also pointed out that under the proviso to Section 12 of the 2016 Act, any person in University service aggrieved by action of the Vice-Chancellor under that sub-section can appeal to the Board within three months. The Board may confirm, modify, or reverse the action. Thus, according to the University, an internal remedy existed.
The Court then turned to the general law on transfer. It reviewed several Supreme Court decisions, including B. Varadha Rao, Shilpi Bose, S.C. Saxena, Mohd. Masood Ahmad, Somesh Tiwari, H.N. Kirtania, State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal, Govt. of A.P. v. G. Venkata Ratnam, Kavi Raj, State of M.P. v. S.S. Kourav, and Tara Chand Khatri.
From these cases, the Court noted settled principles: transfer is normally an incident of service; employees have no vested right to be posted at a particular place; courts interfere only when transfer is contrary to statutory rules, made by an incompetent authority, mala fide, or clearly against public interest; hardship and personal difficulties are for the administration to consider, not for courts to weigh.
At the same time, the Court stressed that transfer power must be exercised by a competent authority. An order by an authority having no such power would be non-existent in law.
With this background, the Court identified two issues: (i) whether the Vice-Chancellor was competent, under the 2016 Act and Statutes, to transfer the petitioner; and (ii) whether the transfer was penal in nature and against public interest.
On the first and crucial issue, the Court closely examined the 2016 Act and Statutes. It accepted that the Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive and academic officer with general supervision and control. The Board of Management, however, has the power of management and administration of revenue and property, and of all administrative affairs of the University not otherwise provided for.
The Statutes empower the Board to create teaching and academic posts, define service conditions, appoint teachers, Deans, Directors, and heads of institutions, regulate discipline, and delegate its powers to the Vice-Chancellor or others under Statute 12(4)(xv).
The Court found that, unlike the repealed 1987 Act, there was no specific provision in the 2016 Act or Statutes vesting transfer power in the Vice-Chancellor. It also noted that no material was produced to show any delegation by the Board to the Vice-Chancellor of transfer powers.
The Court emphasised basic principles of statutory interpretation, relying on Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan and Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal. It held that courts cannot read into a statute words that are not there. Matters not provided in the statute cannot be supplied by judicial construction.
Therefore, the Court held that mere general language about “general supervision and control” does not automatically include transfer powers, especially when the earlier Act had an express transfer provision, which the new Act consciously omits.
It further held that, in the absence of any express provision or delegation, and in the absence of any contrary provision, only the appointing authority – here, the Board of Management, which acts as employer and has disciplinary control – would be competent to decide on transfer.
On this reasoning, the Court concluded that the Vice-Chancellor was not the competent authority to transfer the petitioner, and the transfer order was without jurisdiction.
In view of this finding, the Court considered that examining whether the transfer was penal or against public interest would be an academic exercise and unnecessary.
Regarding the University’s argument of estoppel, waiver, and acquiescence because the petitioner had already joined at BRC, Goroul, the Court rejected it. It relied on S.C. Saxena, which underlines that an employee must first join at the transferred place and then represent against the transfer, and that failure to join should be discouraged.
Here, the petitioner had complied with the transfer, joined, and then challenged it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and violation of the Act and Statutes. The Court held that such a jurisdictional challenge cannot be barred by estoppel or waiver.
Ultimately, the Court set aside Office Order No. 76 dated 18.05.2025 and the relieving order dated 28.05.2025. It directed the University authorities to restore and accept the petitioner’s joining on her earlier post of Assistant Professor, Department of Microbiology, at Pusa forthwith. The writ petition was allowed, with no order as to costs.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment is important for university teachers and other employees working under the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University Act, 2016.
The Patna High Court has made it clear that transfer orders must come from the authority legally empowered to issue them. Even if a post is described as transferable and even if a person has already joined at the new place, the transfer can be struck down if the authority issuing it has no power under the governing Act and Statutes.
The decision also clarifies that the general description of a Vice-Chancellor as “principal executive and academic officer” with “general supervision and control” is not enough, by itself, to assume transfer powers, particularly when the earlier law had an express transfer provision that the new Act omits.
For employees, the judgment shows that joining at the transferred place, in compliance with discipline, does not automatically prevent them from later challenging the transfer on a pure question of law, such as lack of jurisdiction.
For universities and similar institutions, it is a reminder that they must carefully align their transfer practices with the current Act, Statutes, and any formal delegation of power. Long-standing practice cannot override clear statutory schemes.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Did the Vice-Chancellor of Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University have legal authority to transfer the petitioner, an Assistant Professor, under the 2016 Act and Statutes?
Answer: No. The Court held that neither the 2016 Act nor the Statutes expressly vest transfer power in the Vice-Chancellor, nor was any delegation shown. As the Board of Management is the appointing and disciplinary authority, and no contrary provision existed, only the appointing authority could validly order transfer. The Vice-Chancellor’s transfer order was therefore without jurisdiction. - Issue: Could the petitioner be barred from challenging the transfer because she had already joined at the transferred post, on grounds of estoppel, waiver, or acquiescence?
Answer: No. The Court held that compliance with a transfer order by joining at the new place, in line with the discipline principle in S.C. Saxena, does not prevent an employee from later challenging the transfer as being without jurisdiction and contrary to the governing Act and Statutes.
Cases Cited by the Court
- B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 131
- Shilpi Bose (Mrs) & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659
- S.C. Saxena v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 9 SCC 583
- Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 150
- Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 592
- Union of India & Ors. v. H.N. Kirtania, (1989) 3 SCC 447
- State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal, AIR 2001 SC 1748
- Govt. of A.P. v. G. Venkata Ratnam, (2008) 9 SCC 345
- Kavi Raj & Ors. v. State of J & K & Ors., (2013) 3 SCC 526
- State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Sri S.S. Kourav & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1056
- Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 567
- Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907
- Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96
- Ramadhar Pandey v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 35
- Dr. Ramesh Chandra Tyagi v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 416
Case Details
Case Number: Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 11716 of 2025
Case Title: Dr. Geeta Kumari v. Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University & Ors.
Citation: 2025(4) PLJR 416
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Harish Kumar
Date of Judgment: 11-09-2025
Advocates:
- For the Petitioner: Mr. Shivendra Kishore, Senior Advocate; Mr. Saroj Kumar, Advocate
- For the Respondents (University): Mr. P. K. Shahi, Senior Advocate; Mr. Vijay Shankar Upadhyay, Advocate
Nature of the Case: Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging transfer and relieving orders of a university teacher.
Final Outcome: Writ petition allowed; transfer order dated 18.05.2025 and relieving order dated 28.05.2025 set aside; petitioner directed to be restored as Assistant Professor, Department of Microbiology, at Pusa; no order as to costs.
Link to Judgment: Click here to read the full judgment of the Patna High Court
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