Case Background
These writ petitions were filed by a large group of candidates who had been selected as Head Teachers in primary and elementary schools and as Head Masters in higher and senior secondary schools in Bihar.
Their selection was done by the Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC) under two separate advertisements:
Advertisement No. 25/2024 for Head Teachers, governed by the Bihar Elementary Schools Head Teachers Rules, 2024.
Advertisement No. 26/2024 for Head Masters, governed by the Bihar State School Teacher (Appointment, Transfer, Disciplinary Proceedings and Service Conditions) Rules, 2023.
After the BPSC declared the results and prepared the merit lists, the Education Department started counselling and document verification. While this process was on, the Department took an extra step: instead of simply posting candidates anywhere in the State, it tried to accommodate their preferred districts using an online system.
For Head Teachers, on 02.01.2025, the Director, Primary Education, instructed all District Education Officers to collect three district preferences from each successful candidate through the e-ShikshaKosh portal. The letter said district allotment would follow a “merit-cum-choice” principle. Where a preferred district could not be given, the “nearest available district” would be allotted on administrative grounds.
Candidates submitted their choices. On 03.04.2025, the Director, Primary Education, stated that 35,386 Head Teacher candidates had submitted preferences and 35,333 had been verified. Districts were allotted on that basis.
Some candidates, unhappy with the result of this exercise, filed C.W.J.C. No. 16614 of 2025, challenging the orders dated 02.01.2025 and 03.04.2025 for lack of statutory backing. On 23.04.2025, a Single Judge of the Patna High Court passed an interim order restraining the State from further action under those two orders. Later, on 15.07.2025, that writ was disposed of as infructuous.
In the meantime, the Department restarted the process. On 01.07.2025, the Director, Primary Education, issued Memo No. 1837 cancelling the earlier district allotment and starting a fresh one. A committee constituted under Memo No. 896 dated 26.03.2025 used a “District Allocation Software” to allot districts on the merit-cum-choice principle to 35,334 verified candidates who had given preferences.
For Head Masters, the BPSC published results with cut-offs on 01.11.2024. The Director, Primary Education, fixed counselling dates for Head Masters by Memo No. 2951 dated 09.04.2024. Later, under letter No. 350 dated 07.02.2025, the Director, Secondary Education, asked Regional Deputy Directors to collect three division/district options from successful Head Master candidates for posting under Advertisement No. 26/2024.
Candidates submitted three district options through their login on the e-ShikshaKosh portal. District-wise posting lists were then issued under Memo No. 1616 dated 30.06.2025 by the Director, Primary Education. The very next day, on 01.07.2025, letter No. 1617 directed all Regional Deputy Directors and District Education Officers to ask recommended candidates to submit five block options within their allotted districts.
One Head Master challenged Memo No. 1616 dated 30.06.2025 in C.W.J.C. No. 11187 of 2025. The Court granted an interim order staying the operation of Memo No. 1616 as far as that petitioner was concerned.
The present bunch of writ petitions arose from these district and block allotment exercises. The petitioners claimed that, despite higher merit, their preferences were ignored, while candidates with lower rank in the merit list got preferred districts.
What the Court Examined and Decided
Justice Harish Kumar heard all the matters together because the issues were common. Two sets of petitioners were involved: Head Teachers under Advertisement No. 25/2024 and Head Masters under Advertisement No. 26/2024.
The petitioners’ main legal attack had two limbs. First, they argued that neither the Bihar Elementary Schools Head Teachers Rules, 2024 nor the 2023 Rules for school teachers contained any provision for posting on the basis of “merit-cum-choice” or for inviting district preferences. Therefore, the entire exercise of asking for options and allotting districts based on those options was without jurisdiction and lacked any statutory or policy foundation.
They pointed out that, in the earlier writ (C.W.J.C. No. 16614 of 2025), when the Court had asked the State to show which rule or policy allowed the 02.01.2025 and 03.04.2025 preference-based postings, the State could not show any. The State then withdrew those orders. Despite this, the Department again adopted a similar merit-cum-choice exercise via Memo No. 1837 dated 01.07.2025 and for Head Masters via Memos No. 1616 and 1617.
Second, even assuming that merit-cum-choice could be used, the petitioners said it had not been applied uniformly. They claimed that while some candidates got the districts of their choice based on the principle, others were allotted districts through a random software-based process. This, they argued, was arbitrary and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. They also complained that there appeared to be “reservation in posting”, which they said is unknown to service jurisprudence.
The petitioners relied on Supreme Court decisions to support their plea against arbitrariness and procedure without authority of law, including:
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, [(1979) 3 SCC 489], where the Supreme Court stressed that every government action must be based on reason and free from arbitrariness.
Dipak Babaria v. State of Gujarat, [(2014) 3 SCC 502], to argue that when a statute prescribes a particular procedure, it must be followed in that manner and no other.
The State, through the Advocate General, gave a different picture. The Court was told that the State acted out of magnanimity and as a “model employer”, trying to reduce dislocation of newly appointed Head Teachers and Head Masters. The Department wanted them posted nearer their homes so that they could function efficiently in their schools.
The Advocate General emphasized that no candidate has a legal right to demand posting in any particular district. Posting and transfer are incidents of service and lie within the employer’s discretion. The State had only tried to be humane by seeking preferences.
However, the State also admitted that in the first round of allotment, many reserved category candidates faced a peculiar disadvantage. Some reserved category candidates who had scored high enough to be placed in the unreserved category list (often called “meritorious reserved category” candidates) were denied their preferred districts, while less meritorious candidates of the same reserved category, who remained within the reserved list, got postings as per their choice. That grievance led to litigation and stay of postings.
This led the Department to re-examine and redesign the method. The Advocate General explained, with reference to paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the counter affidavit, that the new method had several stages:
First, successful candidates recommended in the unreserved category were given districts according to their choice.
Second, candidates in the disabled and freedom fighter dependent categories were allotted districts on merit-cum-choice.
Third, meritorious reserved category (MRC) candidates–those belonging to reserved categories but selected in the unreserved list–who did not get their first choice under the unreserved quota, were placed above the candidates of their original reserved category (EWS, BC, SC/ST). They were then allotted districts according to their first, second and third preferences.
Fourth, remaining unreserved category candidates who had not got their first choice were considered for their second and third choices.
Finally, those still left without a district as per the above stages or whose three preferences could not be accommodated were allotted districts through a randomization process using software.
The State produced a chart (Annexure-R2/B) showing that more than 92% of eligible candidates had been allotted districts in line with their preferences. Only 2,662 candidates (about 8%) had to be posted by randomization due to non-availability of vacancies in their preferred districts.
The Advocate General submitted that the present petitioners belonged to this 8% group. He argued that the State could, if forced, abandon the entire merit-cum-choice scheme and post everyone randomly, which would cause “large scale displacement and inconvenience” to all candidates, including many who were satisfied with their postings.
The Court first reaffirmed the general law: an employee has no vested right to be posted at a particular place. Even if the Government collects options from employees, it is not bound to accept them. The Court cited State of Bihar v. Kaushal Kishore Singh, 1991(1) PLJR 5 (SC), where the Supreme Court held that options do not create an indefeasible right to a particular post or place.
However, the Court also stressed that when the State, as a welfare State and “model employer”, itself decides to adopt a preference-based scheme linked with merit, it must act fairly and non-arbitrarily. Once such a method is announced and used, more meritorious candidates get a legitimate expectation to be given preference over less meritorious ones, unless there is a strong, lawful reason to depart.
The Court noted that there was no formal rule or written policy empowering the State to run a merit-cum-choice posting scheme. But, as per long-standing principles, in the absence of rules the State may still take administrative decisions that fill a gap, as long as they do not contradict the statute and remain within constitutional limits.
In this case, the Court accepted the Advocate General’s explanation that the State’s object was to reduce dislocation and help teachers stay nearer home, which serves broader welfare and efficiency. The Court held that this approach, on its face, was neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional.
On the core complaint of arbitrariness, the Court closely examined the comparison charts filed by the petitioners and the State. The Court found that the petitioners were mostly comparing themselves with candidates from different reserved categories. Such cross-category comparison, the Court held, was not proper. General category candidates could compare their treatment only with other general category candidates. Within reserved categories, meritorious reserved candidates (MRCs) could not be penalised for scoring better.
To support this, the Court relied on Supreme Court decisions in:
Ritesh R. Sah v. Y.L. Yamul, [(1996) 3 SCC 253], dealing with MRCs in admission and choice of institutions.
Tripurari Sharan v. Ranjit Kumar Yadav, [(2018) 2 SCC 656], reaffirming that MRCs are to be treated as general category candidates for counting purposes but must not be put at a disadvantage in terms of choice.
The Court also relied on a Division Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in Kumar Gaurav Singh & Ors. v. Bihar Staff Selection Commission & Ors. (L.P.A. No. 519 of 2023). There, the Court had held that when MRCs are shifted to districts of their choice into reserved vacancies, the vacated reserved posts should go to less meritorious reserved candidates without disturbing the principle of reservation, and that the Supreme Court rulings in Ritesh R. Sah and Tripurari Sharan applied.
Applying these principles, the Court concluded:
The State’s decision to extend merit-cum-choice at the posting stage, though not backed by formal rules, was a valid welfare-oriented administrative decision and not per se illegal.
The method adopted, including special treatment for MRCs, was in line with Supreme Court precedent and could not be said to violate Articles 14 or 16.
More than 92% of candidates had got the benefit of their preferences. The petitioners, who fell in the remaining 8%, could not claim that the entire exercise was vitiated or demand a complete redo of postings.
However, the Court was not fully comfortable with the last stage of pure randomization through software. Because of this, some candidates had been sent to very far-flung districts without any consideration of their home district or personal circumstances, simply because no vacancy was available in their preferred districts.
To address this limited hardship, the Court directed that the Committee responsible for allocation of preferential districts should invite objections from such candidates and examine them manually. The Committee must consider the home district, reasons for wanting a nearby posting, vacancy position in nearby districts/blocks and merit position, and then consider adjustments where possible.
The Advocate General stated during hearing that the State had no objection to undertaking such an exercise in the interest of these remaining candidates.
Therefore, while dismissing the challenge to the posting system and the impugned memos, the Court issued a positive direction to set up a structured grievance-redressal model for those adversely affected by randomization.
The Court specifically directed the Additional Chief Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, to convene a meeting with the Director, Secondary Education and the Director, Primary Education to frame a model for redressing grievances regarding allotment of nearby districts, after inviting objections. This exercise is to be completed preferably within four weeks from receipt of the Court’s order.
Finally, the Court made an important protection order: the State was directed not to take any adverse action against any Head Teacher or Head Master who had not joined their posts because these writ petitions were pending. With these directions, all writ petitions and pending applications were disposed of.
Why This Judgment Matters
This judgment matters for thousands of newly recruited teachers and for future recruitments in Bihar.
First, the Patna High Court has made it clear that while no teacher has a right to demand a particular district, once the State chooses a merit-cum-choice method for postings, it must broadly honour merit and choice. The Court accepted this method as a legitimate welfare measure by the Education Department.
Second, the judgment protects the interest of meritorious reserved category candidates by affirming that they cannot be placed in a worse position than less meritorious candidates of their own category when it comes to choice of posting.
Third, for those posted to distant districts purely through software randomization, the Court has opened a door: they will get a chance to file objections and ask for a nearer district, subject to vacancy and merit. This is significant for teachers with family responsibilities, health issues, or other constraints.
Fourth, the Court has protected candidates who delayed joining because of the litigation. The State cannot penalise them for waiting for the Court’s decision.
Finally, the judgment signals that the Patna High Court will not lightly interfere with large-scale posting exercises where the broad pattern is fair and rational, but it will intervene to soften extreme hardships caused to a small group when administrative methods like software randomization are used.
Legal Issues and Answers
- Issue: Can the Education Department of Bihar invite district preferences and allot posts on a merit-cum-choice basis in the absence of explicit statutory rules or written policy?
Answer: Yes. The Court held that, even without specific rules, the State may adopt such a welfare-oriented administrative decision as long as it does not contradict existing statutes and complies with Articles 14 and 16. The merit-cum-choice scheme, aimed at minimizing dislocation, was upheld. - Issue: Was the district allotment process for Head Teachers and Head Masters arbitrary or violative of equality, especially where some candidates were allotted districts by randomization?
Answer: No, the process as a whole was not arbitrary. Over 92% candidates received districts as per their preferences by a structured multi-stage method. The Court found no evidence that juniors within the same category were favoured over seniors. However, the Court found the pure randomization stage harsh for the remaining candidates and directed a manual grievance-redressal mechanism for them. - Issue: Do teachers have a legally enforceable right to a posting in the district of their choice simply because the State collected their preferences?
Answer: No. The Court reiterated that posting is an incident of service and no vested right exists to a particular place. Preferences do not create an absolute right, though once a merit-based preference scheme is adopted, the State must apply it fairly and not in an arbitrary manner.
Cases Cited by the Court
- Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489.
- Dipak Babaria v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 3 SCC 502.
- State of Bihar v. Kaushal Kishore Singh, 1991(1) PLJR 5 (SC).
- Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, 1981 (1) SCC 449.
- Balram Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2354.
- Bhupendra Nath Hazarika v. State of Assam, 2013 (2) SCC 516.
- State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, 1992 (4) SCC 118.
- Ritesh R. Sah v. Y.L. Yamul (Dr), (1996) 3 SCC 253.
- Tripurari Sharan v. Ranjit Kumar Yadav, (2018) 2 SCC 656.
- Union of India v. Ramesh Ram, (2010) 7 SCC 234.
- Alok Kumar Pandit v. State of Assam, (2012) 13 SCC 516.
- Kumar Gaurav Singh & Ors. v. Bihar Staff Selection Commission & Ors., L.P.A. No. 519 of 2023 (Patna High Court).
Case Details
Case Number: Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 11252 of 2025, with CWJC Nos. 11508, 12106, 12142, 12213, 12219, 12262, 12306, 12686, 12711, 12743, 12752, 12862, 12868, 12964, 12980, 13022, 13048 of 2025 (heard together).
Case Title: Preeti Kumari & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Ors. (lead matter) with connected petitioners and respondents as listed in the judgment.
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Harish Kumar.
Citation: 2025(4) PLJR 275.
Advocates for Petitioners (across cases): Mr. Abhinav Srivastava, Sr. Advocate; Mr. Lalit Kishore, Sr. Advocate; Mr. Alok Abhinav, Mr. Gyan Prakash, Ms. Diksha Kumari, Ms. Shreyanshi Raj, Mr. Naman Shrestra, Mr. Nityanand Mishra, Mr. Abhishek Mishra, Mr. Shiv Shankar Prasad Yadav, Mr. Mrityunjay Kumar, Mr. Arinjay Kumar, Md. Danish Quamar, Mr. M. P. Dixit, Mr. S. K. Dixit, Mr. Milind Raj Dixit, Mr. Jay Karan, Mr. Jitendra Kumar, Ms. Chetna, Mr. Sujeet Kumar, Mr. Sonu Singh, Mr. Bipin Bihari Singh, Mr. Rakesh Ranjan, Mr. Shyama Kant Singh, Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sinha, Mr. Dhirendra Singh, Mr. Babu Nandan Prasad, and others as recorded.
Advocates for State/Respondents: Mr. P. K. Shahi, Advocate General; various Government Advocates, Additional Advocates General, Standing Counsel and Government Pleaders including AAG-13, GA-3, GA-2, AAG-7, SC-3, GP-12, and others as listed in the judgment.
Advocates for BPSC: Mr. Sanjay Pandey, Advocate; Mr. Nishant Kumar Jha, Advocate, and others as recorded.
Nature of the Case: Writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging district and block allotment orders for newly appointed Head Teachers and Head Masters in Bihar, and seeking fresh allotment strictly on merit-cum-choice.
Date of Judgment: 30-08-2025 (CAV Judgment; CAV date 21-08-2025; uploading date 30-08-2025).
Link to Judgment: Click here to read the full judgment of the Patna High Court.
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